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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
vs. 
DAVID J. ORR, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Appellate Court No. 20030574-CA 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD BE BOUND BY THE DATE STAMP 
ON THE FILING OF THE PROGRESS/VIOLATION REPORT AS A 
MATTER OF LAW. 
It is significant that the State concedes in its Appellee's Brief that". . . AP&P had 
until May 12, 2003 to file a violation report." Appellee Br. 12. Defendant argued in his 
opening brief that the date stamp on the official Progress/Violation Report (attached as 
Add. 1 herein) filed by Agent Egelund showed that it was not formally filed with the 
Court until May 13, 2003. However, Appellee argues in its responsive brief that the date 
it was actually filed is a question of fact and such question of fact will not be reversed 
absent clear error. Appellee Br. 12. Defendant Orr maintains that a date of actual filing 
with the Court is determined as a matter of law based upon the clerk of the court's date-
stamp and the lower court's decision is considered for legal correctness. State v. Parker, 
936 P.2d 1118 (Utah App. 1997) (attached as Add. 2 herein); State v. Palmer, 111 P.2d 
521 (Utah App. 1989). Those cases, at least indirectly, stand for the proposition that the 
official date-stamp placed on a filed document will govern as a matter of law. In Parker, 
the Utah Court of Appeals noted: 
The trial court entered its judgment on October 25, 1994. Defendant dated 
his notice of appeal November 18, 1994, and certified that he mailed the 
notice through the prison mail on November 19, 1994. The district court 
clerk did not date stamp his notice of appeal until nine days later November 
28, 1994. With the notice of appeal, defendant included a Motion for 
Extension dated November 19, 1994, which also was date stamped on 
November 28th, but the trial court never acted on the motion.. . . This court 
dismissed defendant's appeal in an unpublished memorandum decision on 
October 19, 1995, concluding this court lacked jurisdiction to extend the 
time for filing a notice of appeal. 
Defendant then filed a petition for rehearing, which the court granted. 
(W)e affirm our prior ruling dismissing defendant's appeal for lack of 
jurisdiction. 
936 P.2d at 1119, 1122. (See additional discussion infra p. 4, 5). 
Clearly, the Utah Court of Appeals in Parker believed that the date-stamp was the 
critical date on which the filing of a document will be governed as a matter of law. This 
is not the date any third person places upon the document, but the date-stamp placed on 
the document by a court clerk's office itself. See also State v. Palmer, 111 P.2d at 521-
523.' 
1
 "We conclude that the notice of appeal was not timely filed under any plausible 
interpretation of our rules." 777 P.2d at 522. 
2 
The case of In re K.G. 2002, UT App. 3, 2002 WL 23812 (January 4, 2002) also 
stands for the proposition that the date-stamp placed upon a document by the clerk's 
office is the date upon which the document was actually filed as a matter of law. The 
State attempts to distinguish the instant case by suggesting that in the K.G. case "the 
notice of appeal bore one date stamp that showed the notice of appeal was untimely 
filed." Appellee Br. 15. The attempted distinction is not factually appropriate in the 
instant case. The State argues that in the instant case "the violation report reflected two 
dates: (1) an electronic date-stamp showing that the report was timely; and (2) a hand-
written change suggesting that the report was untimely." Id. However, a review of the 
Progress/Violation Report in the instant case (Add. 1) and the document entitled 
"Affidavit in Support of Order to Show Cause" and attached as Add. 2 to Appellant's 
opening brief shows that only one date-stamp appears. While there may be a hand-
written change stating it was filed on May 13, 2003, that is the only date-stamp that 
appears on the face of the violation report. 
The trial judge opined from the bench that the change was probably made by his 
clerk on the date that she officially filed the document, and no testimony or evidence 
under oath was taken to establish that fact in the Order to Show Cause hearing (R. 481, p. 
26,1. 24, 25, p. 27,1. 1-11, p. 28,1. 6-20, p. 29,1. 1-5). Under the circumstances of the 
instant case then, there can be no distinction from the holding in the case of In re KG., 
3 
nor this case. The single date-stamp placed on the document by the clerk of the Court 
must prevail, as the Utah Court of Appeals held in the case of In re K.G., supra at *1. 2 
In addition, the State quotes Raiser v Buirley, 2002 UT App. 277, 54 P.3d 650 
(Utah App. 2002) (per curiam) as standing for the proposition that the Court could 
consider extrinsic evidence under "similar circumstances." Appellee Br. 15. However, 
what the State fails to note is that the Raiser case was exceptional and a clear aberration 
from the normal rule where all courts are bound by the date-stamp on a filed document. 
In that case, the Utah Court of Appeals relied upon the case ofIn re M.S., 781 P.2d 1287 
(Utah Ct. App. 1989) (per curiam) for its initial dismissal of an appeal for lack of 
jurisdiction based upon an untimely notice of appeal where it had held that an "appellate 
court is 'bound by the filing date indicated on the notice of appeal transmitted to it by the 
trial court.' Id. at 1288" Id. at [^2. Upon further review, this panel of the Utah Court of 
Appeals reversed its judgment based upon the fact that a timely filing of a notice of 
appeal had earlier been made although the court had rejected it for failure to timely pay 
the filing fee. The Court noted as follows: 
Under the unique circumstances of this case, we deem the notice of 
appeal to have been filed on September 20, 2001, when it was first accepted 
and date-stamped by the district court clerk. The delay of one week in 
2
 Although Agent Egelund testified he punched the date-stamp on the report 
himself at the clerk's office, the State cites no authority allowing anyone other than the 
clerk of the Court to officially date-stamp a filed document. Allowing anyone else to do 
so and be recognized would be to open up the system to confusion and potential abuse, as 
in the instant case. 
4 
rejecting the notice of appeal and returning it to Raiser based upon the 
apparent failure to tender an acceptable filing fee was ineffective because 
the timely notice of appeal had been accepted as "filed" by the clerk. 
To deem the acceptance revokable would work an injustice because Raiser 
could reasonably rely upon either acceptance of the notice of appeal or its 
prompt rejection. 
Id. at f^9. (Emphasis added). 
What was clear from the court's decision in that case was that a set of "unique 
circumstances" had been presented to it, but those circumstances involved a clear and 
timely filing and acceptance as filed by the clerk which was then later rejected. The 
situation is quite different in the instant case. There is no date on the Progress/Violation 
Report except May 13, 2003. There was not a rejection of the document and return to the 
filer based upon some extrinsic matter such as payment of a fee. It is significant to note 
that the court in Raiser ruled the way it did because the clerk's office had clearly accepted 
a timely notice of appeal as "filed" on a prior occasion and then later rejected it. 
Defendant suggests that this case is not inapposite as does the State, but rather it is 
support for the proposition that the date-stamp will be accepted by the court as a matter of 
law as the date an item is filed. 
Furthermore, the Raiser case does not stand for the proposition that the court's 
opinion in that case created a circumstance where the court was to consider the question 
of the official filing of the document as a matter of fact and not law. Therefore, the 
argument made by the State that "Defendant has not demonstrated the trial court's finding 
that the report was timely filed on May 9th was clearly erroneous" is an incorrect 
5 
statement of the standard of review and must be disregarded by this Court. Furthermore, 
the Court is asked to specifically review the case of State v. Parker, supra (Add. 2) which 
makes clear that even under circumstances where the situation seems unfair, the date-
stamp by the clerk's office is the official "filing" of the court as a matter of law for 
jurisdictional purposes. In that case, the trial court had entered a judgment on 
Defendant's guilty plea on October 25, 1994. Defendant dated his notice of appeal 
November 18, 1994, clearly within the 30 day filing requirement, and certified that he 
mailed the notice through the prison mail on November 19, 1994. The district court clerk 
did not date-stamp his notice of appeal until nine days later - November 28, 1994. Id. at 
1118. The Court of Appeals noted that".. . the reasoning of Houston {Houston v. Lack, 
487 US 266, 108 S.Ct. 2379, 101 L.Ed.2d 245 (1988)) and the policies underlying the 
prison delivery rule are compelling. . . . In holding the filing was timely, the Houston 
court emphasized that an incarcerated pro se defendant's lack of control over the filing of 
his or her notice of appeal is unique. . . . We understand why many of our sister states 
have decided to adopt Houston's interpretation of the federal rules to their own state rules 
of procedure . . ." Id at 1120, 1121. 
Despite its apparent feeling that there were unfair circumstances in Parker, the 
Court of Appeals declined to apply the prison delivery rule to correct what it seemed to be 
admitting was an injustice and felt that it was up to the Supreme Court, which had the 
ultimate authority for drafting Rules of Appellate Procedure, to draft the prison delivery 
6 
rule and correct this particular wrong. Id. at 1122. The date-stamp was official as a 
matter of law. 
It is Defendant Orr's argument that if this issue is to be viewed as a matter of law, 
there can be no question that the Progress/Violation Report was not filed until May 13, 
2003, one day after the State admits Defendant's probation terminated by operation of 
law. If such was the case, then the State's argument regarding Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-
1(1 l)(b) tolling the running of the probation period upon the filing of a violation report is 
not valid and should be rejected by this Court in this case. The clerk of the court made a 
handwritten change to reflect the official date filed, despite the fact that it may have been 
punched with a date-stamp earlier by a third person who was not an official court clerk, 
Agent Egelund. It is the official date entered for filing by the clerk of the court, not the 
probation agent which should govern here.3 
3
 This Court is asked to take judicial notice of the Third District Court's formal 
official docketing record for the instant case which reflects the officially filed date for the 
Progress/Violation Report and Affidavit in Support of Order to Show Cause as May 13, 
2003. (Add. 6, p. 13). 
7 
POINT II 
DEFENDANT'S RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS OF LAW UNDER 
BOTH THE UTAH AND UNITED STATES CONSTITUTIONS WAS 
VIOLATED BECAUSE HE WAS NOT TIMELY SERVED WITH 
NOTICE THAT THE STATE WAS ATTEMPTING TO REVOKE, 
MODIFY OR EXTEND HIS PROBATION. 
In his opening brief, Defendant Orr argued that his probation had ended by 
operation of law on May 12, 2003 and the Court lost jurisdiction over him at that time 
because he was not provided notice of the Court's action until May 19, 2003. Appellant 
cited, among others, the case of State v. Rawlings, 893 P.2d 1063 (Utah App. 1995) 
(attached as Add. 3) for this proposition. In its responsive brief, the State does not deny 
that Defendant was not provided formal notice of the Order to Show Cause in the trial 
judge's court until May 19, 2003, nor that the trial judge did not sign the Order to Show 
Cause until May 13, 2003, one day after Defendant's probation terminated by operation 
of law. See Add. 5. 
Instead, the State attempts to distinguish the Rawlings case by suggesting the case 
holding, that jurisdiction to extend probation depended upon service before expiration of 
the probation period, was actually decided upon statutory grounds alone, and not by the 
constitutional concept of due process of law; and further, that the statute interpreted was 
prior to the tolling provision of 11(b) and so should not be used as precedent in the instant 
case. The State's assertion in this regard is incorrect and misleading. Although it is true 
that the court in Rawlings interpreted the 1985 provision of Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1, 
8 
and the tolling provision 11(b) was not passed until 1989, it is simply not true that the 
concept of due process of law was not the determining factor, or at least the co-
determining factor, in the Rawlings case. 
In Rawlings, the Utah Court of Appeals cited the earlier case of Smith v. Cook, 803 
P.2d 788 (Utah 1990) as precedent and quoted extensively from that opinion.4 Among the 
quotations the Rawlings court cited from that opinion was the following: 
Furthermore, the court felt that its holding was appropriate because it 
"guarantee(d) the fundamental fairness embodied in the due process clause 
of the United States Constitution (which) entitle(s) probationers to written 
notice of the accusations against them." Id. at 795. (parenthetical words 
and letters in original). 
Rawlings at 1068. 
Clearly then, the Utah Court of Appeals found that the due process clause of the United 
States Constitution was violated where petitioner did not receive written notice of the 
accusation against him prior to the date of expiration of the defendant's probation in both 
Smith and Rawlings. 
The State's responsive brief, in attempting to reach for precedent which would 
cause this Court to avoid a due process analysis in the instant case, further makes the 
statement that "(N)othing in the Smith opinion remotely suggests that due process 
requires notice, in addition to filing a report, during the probation period . . .". Appellee 
4
 "While Smith involved statutory prerequisites to commencement of a probation 
revocation proceeding, the same analysis is applicable to statutory prerequisites to 
commencement of probation extension proceedings...." (Italics in original). 
9 
Br. 18. But, as noted above and as quoted in the later Rawlings case, the Utah Supreme 
Court in Smith v. Cook did indeed address directly "the fundamental fairness embodied in 
the due process clause of the United States Constitution (which) entitle(s) probationers to 
written notice of the accusations against them." Smith at 795. In fact, in a footnote, the 
Smith court cited the decision of the United States Supreme Court in Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 
411 U.S. 778, 786, 93 S.Ct. 1756, 1761-62, 36 L.Ed.2d 656 (1973) and its own earlier 
decision in the case of State v. Cowdell, 626 P.2d at 488 (Utah 1981) for this due process 
proposition. 
The Cowdell case is particularly instructive and makes the due process analysis in 
Smith v. Cook (and later in State v. Rawlings) particularly relevant. In Cowdell, the Utah 
Supreme Court specifically held as follows: 
The decision of a trial court to modify or revoke a probation is basically a 
discretionary matter, § 77-18-1, U.CA., (1953 as amended). Nevertheless, 
in revoking a probation, a court may not ignore fundamental precepts of 
fairness protected by the due process clause... . 
626P.2dat488. 
Although the Cowdell case involved a revocation as opposed to an extension of 
probation, the principle of due process remains the same. In Smith v. Cook, supra, the 
Supreme Court of Utah noted "(T)he general nature of probation places significant 
restrictions on the liberty of the person placed on probation. The penal quality of 
probation is also clear from § 77-18-l(4)(Supp. 1981), which states thait as a condition of 
probation the trial court can impose fines, require restitution, and impose jail sentences... 
10 
." Id. at 793. The Smith court also noted in its holding as quoted previously: "(W)e hold 
that in situations where the probationer is not actively avoiding supervision, in order for 
a trial court to retain its authority over the probationer beyond the period of 
probation, the probationer must be served with an order to show cause within the 
probationary period," Id. at 796. (Emphasis added). 
Although the State would have this Court believe that Smith and Rawlings were 
not decided on due process grounds, clearly this Court can see otherwise. The State may 
also argue that the only thing that matters, even if due process is involved, is that such 
constitutional rights under both the Utah and United States Constitution should only be 
applied where there is a danger of revocation of probation rather than extension or 
modification. However, this argument completely overlooks the requirements of U.C.A. 
§ 77-18-1 (as amended 2000) which specifically states "(12)(a)(i) probation may not be 
modified or extended except upon waiver of a hearing by the probationer or upon a 
hearing and a finding in court that the probationer has violated the conditions of 
probation." (emphasis supplied). 
In State v. Call, cited in Appellant's opening brief (Add. 4), the Utah Supreme 
Court was called upon to decide a case of extension of probation. After citing State v. 
Green, 757 P.2d 462 (Utah 1988) and Smith v. Cook, supra, the Utah Supreme Court 
held: 
These cases instruct that if it is the intent of the state to extend the 
probationary period beyond its original term, the state must take definitive 
11 
action to extend the term before the expiration date, and the probationer 
must be given notice of that intent. Otherwise the probationer is left in a 
state of uncertainty, not knowing whether to continue to observe the terms 
of his probation. 
Call, 1999 UT 42, 980 P.2d 201 at 1fl 1. (Emphasis added). 
The court specifically noted that the State of Utah argued that § 77-18-1 (Supp. 1996) 
(1 l)(b) should be determinative of the case. However, the Utah Supreme Court did not 
determine that (1 l)(b) was determinative of the case but found that because the probation 
officer had approached Call well in advance of the termination date and he signed a 
waiver of a right to hearing and agreed to an extension of his probation for one more year, 
Call ". . . received actual notice that his term of probation would not expire at the 
conclusion of the statutory 36 month period." Id. at ^[11. Therefore, it must be concluded 
that the Utah Supreme Court continues to affirm its prior holdings in Smith and Rawlings 
that a probationer must be served with a notice of his probation violation and upcoming 
court appearance prior to the expiration of his probation period before his right to due 
process of law has been effectively observed by a trial court. 
It is understandable why the State does not want this Court to engage in a due 
process analysis in the instant case. This is because the due process holdings of Smith, 
Rawlings, Call and State v. Grate, 947 P.2d 1161 (Utah App. 1997) (quoted in 
Appellant's opening brief) all clearly stand for the proposition that this Court and the 
Utah Supreme Court have always engaged in a due process analysis when looking at the 
12 
issue of a defendant receiving proper notice of probation violation proceedings. In the 
case of State v. Grate, the Utah Court of Appeals held: 
Finally, our conclusion that the charging of a probation violation requires 
service of notice on a probationer of the actual accusations and of the need 
to prepare a defense not only removes the "danger of placing (probationers) 
in a state of perpetual limbo" which so concerned our Supreme Court in 
Green and Smith, but "is also in accord with the decisions of th(at) court, as 
well as the United States Supreme Court, holding that the guarantees of 
fundamental fairness embodied in the due process clause of the United 
States Constitution entitle probationers to written notice of the 
accusations against them prior to their revocation hearings." Smith, 
803 P.2d at 795 (footnote omitted). 
947 P.2d at 1167. (Emphasis added). 
Despite the State's incorrect assertions otherwise, there simply can be no question that 
both this Court and the Utah Supreme Court have engaged in a significant due process 
analysis when it relates to the question of notice to probationers of the state's intent to 
extend, modify or revoke probation. 
The State further glosses over and attempts to disregard the fact that, the trial judge 
in this matter did not sign the Order to Show Cause until May 13, 2003, one day after the 
State admits Defendant's probation would have terminated by operation of law. (See 
Add. 5 herein). In State v. Raw lings, the Utah Supreme Court in reviewing facts found in 
Smith v. Cook, supra, stated as follows: 
. . . Three months before his probation expired, the plaintiff was again 
arrested and charged with two counts of sexual abuse of a child and sodomy 
upon a child. As a result of this arrest, an incident report and affidavit to 
show cause why the plaintiffs probation should not be revoked were filed 
with the court before the expiration of the defendant's probation. However 
n 
the court did not order the plaintiff to show cause why his probation 
should not be revoked until after the plaintiffs original term of 
probation had expired. Thus the plaintiff was first given notice of the 
probation revocation proceedings after his probation had expired. . . . 
893 P.2d at 1067, 1068 citing Smith 803 P.2d at 789. (Emphasis added). 
The Smith court had gone on with its due process analysis and indicated that the 
probationer's right to written notice of the accusations against him prior to the 
termination of the probation period by operation of law was "guarantee(d) (by) 
fundamental fairness embodied in the due process clause of the United States 
Constitution. ..". 803 P.2d at 795. 
This Court is asked to reject the State's inappropriate and misleading argument 
suggesting that the Rawlings and Smith cases did not involve a due process analysis; and 
in this case, where the Judge didn't even sign the Order to Show Cause until one day after 
Defendant Orr's probation period terminated, find that Defendant Orr was denied his 
Utah and U.S. Constitutional rights to due process of law where he was served with the 
Judge's Order seven days after his probation terminated by operation of law. 
The State cites the case of State v. Reedy as being "the only case to directly address 
the effect of subsection 11(b)" and further claims that case expressly rejected Defendant's 
argument herein. Appellee Br. 17.5 The State goes on to challenge Defendant's argument 
in his opening brief that Reedy was not dispositive of the instant matter due to the fact 
5
 Of course the state completely overlooks and/or intentionally disregards State v. 
Call, supra p. 10, 11 in boldly making this statement. 
;14 
that the Court found that defendant had "made service impracticable since he left Utah 
without permission and was in California when he claims he should have been served." 
Defendant noted in his opening brief "Because this case was decided several months prior 
to the Grate case, and because it is clear that defendant had left the jurisdiction and could 
not be served with the court's proposed action violating his probation, Defendant 
maintains that this case is inapposite and does not affect the dismissal requested by him. 
Reedy's due process rights were essentially waived by his evasion of supervision and 
leaving the state so he could not be located to be served. No such facts exist in the instant 
case. If it were otherwise, the Grate court surely would have relied on Reedy as 
precedent. Reedy was decided April 17, 1997 and Grate was decided October 30, 1997." 
Appellant Br. 21, n. 4. 
Appellee states "a fair reading of Reedy, however, reveals that this observation 
was not necessary to the Court's decision, but was dicta." Appellant Br. at 20. Defendant 
asserts that Appellee's analysis of Reedy is not correct. Defendant Orr continues to 
maintain that a "fair" reading of Reedy suggests that the issue of Reedy having evaded 
supervision and left the state was not dicta. Rather, Defendant Orr maintains that the 
appellate court in Reedy understood that due process and fundamental fairness were clear 
issues in the matter, as it discussed later in the Grate case. The court in Reedy did not 
need to become involved in an extensive due process analysis due to the fact that 
defendant had made service impracticable since he left Utah without permission and was 
15 
in California when he claims he should have been served. The court went on to review 
Smith v. Cook and the Utah Supreme Court's opinion therein. The Reedy court did not 
out of hand reject the Smith analysis simply on the basis that (1 l)(b) had not yet been 
enacted when the Smith court was considering the facts of that case, but cited the 
distinction made by the Smith court, then specifically stated: 
. . . the Smith court concluded that the trial court lost jurisdiction to revoke 
probation because Smith was not served with notice of the revocation 
proceedings within the probation period. Id. at 795-796. The court noted 
that the rule might be different in a situation where a probationer avoided 
service or evaded supervision . . . Reedy evaded supervision by leaving 
Utah and failing to check in with probation authorities; thus, even under the 
Smith analysis, it would not be necessary to serve him during the probation 
period. 
937P.2datl53. 
Although the Reedy court does not specifically mention due process, it is clear 
from the foregoing and its entire review of the Smith case that it was referring to the due 
process analysis in the Smith case. Although the State would like this Court to ignore 
virtually the entire Reedy opinion and read it as simply holding that § 77-18-1(1 l)(b) is 
dispositive of the matter and nothing further need be said, the State's analysis of Reedy is 
incorrect and inappropriate. Defendant urges the Court to consider that the court in Reedy 
would have had to come to a different conclusion had the Defendant not evaded 
supervision and not been available to be served prior to the time of termination of 
probation based upon its analysis in the Grate case decided just six months later. 
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In the instant case, there is no evidence whatsoever nor any argument by the State 
either below or on appeal that Defendant Orr was not available to be served. Indeed, 
Defendant Orr's probation officer specifically testified that the only reason he waited 
until May 19, 2003, some seven days after Defendant's probation would have terminated 
by operation of law even by the State's admission, was because "(T)hat
 w a s the soonest I 
was going to see him." Mr. Egelund admitted that he did not make any extra effort to 
notify Defendant Orr of the Order to Show Cause hearing and the possibility that the 
Court would revoke, extend or modify his probation until May 19, 2003. (R. 481, p. 22,1. 
8-20).6 
The State also correctly notes that Defendant relies upon State v. Call, supra (Add. 
4) for the proposition that (1 l)(b) does not affect a Defendant's right to notice and thus 
due process of law. However, the State rejects Defendant's argument and suggests that 
the Call Court's reliance on Green and Smith should be disregarded because "Neither 
case rested on due process concerns." Appellee Br. 23. Defendant has already rebutted 
the allegation that Smith did not rest on due process concerns and again notes to the Court 
the extent to which the State has gone to provide this misleading analysis to the Court. 
6
 The Court is reminded here, as stated in Defendant's opening brief at 14, that the 
probation officer testified below he notified Defendant he was recommending termination 
of the probation to the trial judge and allowing restitution to be handled by the civil 
process (R. 481, p. 22,1. 21-25, p. 23,1. 1-14). This was the only notice received by 
Defendant Orr until May 19, 2003, seven days after his probation ended by operation of 
law. 
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Although the State is correct that the court in Call did not explicitly decide that case on 
due process concerns, what it fails to note is that the statement made by the court: 
(T)hese cases instruct that if it is the intent of the state to extend 1he 
probationary period beyond its original term, the state must take definitive 
action to extend the term before the expiration date and the probationer 
must be given notice of that intent. Otherwise the probationer is left in a 
state of uncertainty not knowing whether to continue to observe the terms of 
his probation.. . . 
clearly must have been made based upon the due process analysis of the Smith and Green 
cases. Call at J^l 1. (emphasis added). If such was not the case, why would the Utah 
Supreme Court have made such a blanket statement in 1999 analyzing a case which 
clearly occurred after (1 l)(b) was enacted in 1989, ten years earlier and was even cited by 
the court in its decision? See Call at [^8. Perhaps the State would like to argue that our 
Supreme Court simply overlooked (1 l)(b), but such a conclusion would not be justified 
by the analysis contained therein. Defendant maintains that our Supreme Court has 
reiterated as late as 1999 that despite § 77-18-1(1 l)(a), two things must occur prior to the 
expiration date of a defendant's original probation term, and they are (1) the state must 
take definitive action to extend the term before the expiration date and (2) the probationer 
must be given notice of that intent before the expiration date. To suggest that the second 
prong of this statement is anything other than an opinion couched with a due process 
foundation as the State does in its responsive brief is to misunderstand and misread the 
prior decisions of this Court in Cowdell, Grate, Smith v. Cook and, as the court in State v. 
Call noted, State v. Green. Call at f^l 1. 
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Defendant respectfully requests that this Court find that his right to due process of 
law under both the Utah and U.S. Constitutions were violated and the Court lost 
jurisdiction over him when the State failed to serve him with the Order to Show Cause for 
probation violation, extension or modification prior to the termination of his probation by 
operation of law. 
POINT III 
REPLY TO STATE'S RESPONSE IN POINT'S II AND III OF ITS 
BRIEF. 
The State argues in Point II of its responsive brief that a court has authority to 
extend probation upon a finding that the probationer has not completed the terms of his 
probation, including fully paying court-ordered restitution. While Defendant in his 
opening brief and herein does not deny that a court has such authority, the real issue is 
whether or not the state is required to give the Defendant due process notice before the 
termination of the probation period in order to extend or modify, as well as revoke 
probation. Defendant cited the case of State v. Hodges, 798 P.2d 270 (Utah App. 1990) 
in arguing that his probation could be extended only if his failure to pay restitution was 
willful. Although the State correctly notes that the Hodges court involved a revocation of 
probation as opposed to an extension of probation, Utah law makes clear that probation 
may not be modified or extended except upon a waiver of a hearing by the probationer 
or upon a hearing and finding in court probationer had violated the conditions of 
probation. Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-l(12)(a)(i) (Supp. 2000). However, it is Defendant's 
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argument that the Court must find that the violation referred to in that statute was a 
"willful" violation. 
The State's assertion that the Hodges case involved a revocation of probation is 
correct as far as it goes; but it is Defendant's position that Hodges stands for the 
proposition that where the alleged violation is a failure to pay a fine and/or restitution, the 
sentencing court must still find that probationer willfully violated the terms and 
conditions of his probation in order to extend, modify or revoke that probation. Where, as 
here, "(T)he defendant has made consistent monthly payments of $1,000.00 towards 
restitution", the State fails to show any willful violation of the Court's restitution order. 
See Progress/Violation Report, Add. 1, second page under the heading "Restitution." 
In State v. Peterson, 869 P.2d 989, 991 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) the Utah Court of 
Appeals specifically indicated that in the context of an alleged failure to pay restitution 
(i.e. as grounds for revocation/modification of probation), "a finding of wilfulness merely 
requires a finding that the probationer did not make bona fide efforts to meet the 
conditions of his probation." No such finding was made by the trial judge in the instant 
matter. Without finding both a violation and wilfulness (i.e. the absence ofbona fide 
efforts to pay restitution), the District Court had no basis for ordering an extension of his 
probation, even if this Court rules the District Court still had jurisdiction of Defendant 
Orr. 
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In Point III of its brief, the State admits that the trial court exceeded its authoni) in 
extending the Ddendani s pn 'b.uion lor ten years (seven years with credit for the three 
years previousl} sei /ed & it! IC 1 it • • iolatioi i) 1 1 le State at gi les the • i i lattei si: 101 lie • e 
remanded for the trial court to amend its Order to extend probation lo V ;M ^r • rhile 
~ * \ 'idant appreciates the State's concession in liu- mai;.[ ; I )e!endant >nll argues liiat Lis 
due process of law under both the Utah and United States Constiti itions were 
lul liCL.i- - - - lale legal idluih lo t:\liini Ins |ni>baliuii n iu 1 nol mat". • ) 
its termination i r^ration of law; and he was denied in> !: J i - • •. . .. ^-t 
being served prior to his probation's termination by operation of law. I lowever, die 
Defendant agrees that the very least this Court ought to do is remand the case for the 
Defendai it to be r esei ltei iced for 36 i i 101 ltl is of pi obation be ginni i iglv la> 12, 20 -». 
CONCLUSION 
Defendant urges this Court to consider ;ju; violation of his rights to due process of 
law under the circumstances of this case. I le was not afforded "fundamental fairness" in 
at t i,€ w as essei itiall> lead tc belie\ e b> his pr obatioi l off icei , a s at gue< 1 ii 11 lis .-; !..„ 
brief and not disputed by the State, that 11 i pr* >bni ior. u»- :d !v terminate d ,i« . * • *.• 
2003. He was not served with notice uniil Max i*>. Min_- ot'lhc iaci thai tlie Court had 
decided to take further action against him. 
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For these and the other reasons outlined in Appellant's opening brief and this reply 
brief, it is respectflilly requested that this Court order that Defendant be released from the 
custody of the trial court, with his probation having been terminated by operation of law. 
Dated this JtL daY of Jfi& U 2004. 
COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL, P.C. 
gfcM^. 
LARRlfR. KELLER 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
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STATE OF UT 
UMH I PROBATION A 
jihmw*bv 
PROTECTED 
PROGRESS/VIOLATION REPORT 
n -^ ^ ffl * 
"'. MT LAKE roUhTY" 
) : 3RD DISTRICT-
Salt Lake City, Salt Lake County, Utah. 
I I N linU | miolhyR II mson 
I O M Salt Lake AP&P 
BfcPfcfTY CLERK 
R E G A R D I N G : ORR, David Jay 
C A S E NO.- 001W2772 
( H I T INS*. 1
 ( il Lstate Biokei A»ent Willi l > il 
I i n nse, 3rd Degree Felony, 
i ecuu l i e s Fraud, 3rd Degree Felony 
ATE: 05/09/2003 
J O B A T I O N D A T E : 05/12/2000 
Mi ' lM M I M D V f E : U5/11/2UU3 
E F E N S E A T T Y : Larry K Keller 
nHMNDM? 1/ 1 "JM ' 
ADDRESS: 5449 W SUNTREE (3350 S ) AVE, 
WFST V AT LFY CITY T TT 841 ?0 
EMPLOYMENT: Mca-Mark/Consult/Agent 
Y2 Marketing, 
1801 North Hampton //120, 
DesofoTX 75115 
)MMENTS: 
05/12/2000, the defendant was placed on probation with the following; conditions: 
Commit no further violations and/or crimes. 
Obtain and maintain lawful, verifiable, full-tune employment. 
Submit truthful and detailed financial income reports to AP&P as diircted 
Pay fine in the amount of $ 1850 00, payable to the Court. 
That the defendant avoid all activities involving investments or other tmancial transactions using assets 
belonging to persons outside of his immediate family or requiring professional hVeri< inp 
Serve 180 days in the Salt Lake County Jail, commencing on 05/12/00, with no uulil iui time served. 
Have no contact with victims. 
Pay restitution, in an amount to be determined, at a rate of $1000 per month or 25% of monthly income. 
LOBATIONUPDA1L: Ihedil I t li i > been niiiutal lakrally loi Conspiiaiy io ( tiiiiuit J1 laii 
aud, Wire Freud and Conspii in Io Detraud The United Stales, 18 U S.C. 371. Theit is lour othei u> 
fendants indicted with the d f 1 int According to the indictment, the latest date the defendant is 
arged is in February 200(1 The defendant was convicted of his probation case in March 2000 and placed 
probation in May 2000, thus, the new federal charge occurred before the defendant's current Third 
strict probation case. 
HE; OKR, David Jay - 2 -
FINES/FEES: The defendant has paid $600 of the $1,850 court fine. He is presently overdue $150 on 
supervision fees. The Department Of Corrections accounting department has not correctly distributed the 
money received by the defendant He has paid $34,553.20 on this case for restitution and fines. 
RESTITUTION: The defendant has made consistent monthly payments of $1,000 towards restitution. 
After two Restitution Hearings, Dr. Tom Million is to be paid $255,504. Additionally, Kurt Ostler is owed 
$30,000, Jeff Ostler $30,000 and Craig Grenier $50,000. 
SUMMARY: The defendant has not been found in any violation of his probation to date with the 
exception of paying in full the restitution amount. His 36-month probation period is approaching. He has 
pending federal charges. 
RECOMMENDATION: It is recommended by Adult Probation and Parole that an Order To Show 
Cause Hearing be conducted at the Courts convenience. 
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Under these specific circumstances, due pro 
cess does not mandate that the violation re 
port should have been sent to Byington be-
fore the hearing or that he must have been 
given additional time to review the report a1 
the hearing. Thus, Byington's du< pron-x 
claim fails. 
. CONCLUSION 
The record establishes that Byington fairly 
understood the nature of the probation revo-
cation hearing and that counsel would be 
appointed for him if he chose. These basic 
understandings are enough to render Bying-
ton's waiver of his statutory right to counsel 
sufficient under the circumstances. Further, 
Byington has not demonstrated how his 
hearing was fundamentally unfair based on 
the fact that the violation report was not 
provided to him beforehand. We therefore 
affirm the trial court's revocation of Bying-
ton's probation. 
JACKSON and ORME, JJ., concur. 
STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v. 
Terence L. PARKER, ivtendant 
ar»d Appellant. 
No 1f!07:^-CA 
Court of Appeals of \ Ttah. 
April 10, 1997. 
Defendant was convicted in the District 
• • d, Salt Lake Department, Tyrone Med-
of attempted burglary, and he appeal-
ed. The Court of Appeals dismissed defen-
^r, ' ' c appeal as untimely, and defendant 
virion for rehearing. On rehearing 
of Appeals, Billings, J., held that 
• v^>rv rule did. not apply * -M- -
mining whether defendant's notice of appeal 
was timely filed, 
Affirmed. 
Mi aia :.ot applj in 
determining whether defendant's notice of 
appeal was timely filed under rule requiring 
notice of appeal to be filed within 30 days; 
motion was filed when district court clerk 
received notice, not when it was delivered to 
prison authorities. Rules App.Proc, Rule 
4(a). '. , '
 :. 
Terence Lee Parker, West Jordan, Pro Se. 
Jan Graham and Thomas B. Brunker, Salt 
Lake City, for Plaintiff and Appellee. 
Before W1LK i .N. -. A^M K:. ,. • < ; 
BILLINGS and <».Mr M 
BILL 
Defendant Terence L. Parker seeks rever-
sal of our prior ruling dismissing his appeal 
for lack of jurisdiction because his notice of 
appeal was filed with the district court clerk 
more than thirty days after entry of judg-
ment. After considering his .petition for re-
hearing, we dismiss defendant's appeal 
FACTS 
Defendant pleaded guilty to attempted 
burglary. The trial court held the plea in 
abeyance pending defendant's compliance 
with certain conditions. Defendant failed to 
comply with one condition, and the trial court 
ruled that defendant had violated the terms 
of the plea-in-abeyance agreement and ac-
cepted defendant's guilty plea. Defendant 
was incarcerated at the Utah State Prison. 
The trial court entered its judgment on 
October 25, 1994. Defendant dated his no-
tice of appeal November 18, 1994, and certi-
fied that he mailed the notice through the 
prison mail on November 19, 1994. The 
district court clerk did not date stamp his 
notice of appeal until nine days later—No-
vember 28,. 1994, With the notice of appeal. 
STATE v. 
Citeas936 P-2d 11 
defendant included a Motion for Extension 
dated November 19, 1994, which also was 
date stamped on November 28, but the trial 
court never acted on the motion. 
Defendant timely filed with this court his 
Docketing Statement on December 21, 1994, 
and his brief on July 21, 1995. On Septem-
ber 13, 1995, the State moved, under Utah 
Rule of Appellate Procedure 10, to dismiss 
defendant's appeal for lack of jurisdiction 
because he filed his notice of appeal one day 
after the time limit.1 This court dismissed 
defendant's appeal in an unpublished memo-
randum decision on October 19, 1995, con-
cluding this court lacked jurisdiction to ex-
tend the time for filing a notice of appeal. 
Defendant then filed a petition for rehear-
ing, which this court granted. This court 
ordered the case remanded to the trial court 
for a ruling on defendant's timely motion to 
extend the time for appeal. On remand, the 
trial court denied defendant's motion to ex-
tend the time for appeal. Based on the trial 
court's denial of the motion, this court or-
dered plenary consideration of the issue now 
before us: Whether the "prison delivery 
rule" should be adopted and applied to inter-
pret Rule 4 of the Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure, thereby making defendant's ap-
peal timely. 
ANALYSIS 
Defendant argues this court should not 
have dismissed his appeal as untimely be-
cause we should adopt the "prison delivery 
rule," articulated by the United States Su-
preme Court in Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 
266, 108 S.Ct 2379, 101 L.Ed.2d 245 (1988), 
to interpret our state rules of appellate pro-
cedure. In response, the State argues we 
have already rejected the prison delivery-
rule in State v. Palmer, 111 P.2d 521 (Utah 
CtA.pp.1989) (per curiam). 
1. Defendant's notice of appeal was due on Fri-
day, November 25, 1994, which makes the date 
his notice was filed, Monday, November 28, 
1994, one day past the thirty-day limit provided 
by Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 4 
2. Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a)(1) 
(amended 1993) provided. 
PARKER Utah 1119 
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In Palmer, this court summarily dis-
missed, in a per curiam opinion, a pro se 
prisoner's appeal because his notice of appeal 
was filed more than thirty days after entry of 
judgment See id at 523 (per curiam). The 
Palmer court concluded "the notice of appeal 
was not timely filed under any plausible in-
terpretation of our rules." Id. at 522 (per 
curiam). The court reasoned that Rule 4 
provides that a notice of appeal must be 
"filed" with the trial court, and that "[t]o hold 
that filing in the trial court is complete upon 
mailing is inconsistent" with the plain lan-
guage of Rule 4. Id. (per curiam). Howev-
er, the Palmer court did not discuss nor 
mention Houston's prison delivery rule. 
Therefore, we take this opportunity to specif-
ically consider whether Houston 's prison de-
livery rule should be adopted in Utah, 
In Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266, 268-69, 
108 S.Ct. 2379, 2381, 101 L.Ed.2d 245 (1988), 
a pro se prisoner sought appellate review of 
a federal district court judgment dismissing 
his pro se habeas corpus petition. The pris-
oner deposited his notice of appeal with pris-
on authorities three days before the deadline, 
but the notice was not filed by the district 
court clerk until one day after the deadline. 
See id. The United States Supreme Court 
held that an incarcerated pro se prisoner's 
notice of appeal was timely filed when the 
prisoner delivered it to prison authorities for 
forwarding to the district court clerk within 
the thirty-day period required by Federal 
Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a)(1). See id. 
At the time of Houston, Federal Rule of 
Appellate Procedure 4(a)(1) was nearly iden-
tical to the current version of Utah Rule of 
Appellate Procedure 4(a).2 See Houston, 487 
U.S. at 276,108 S.Ct. at 2385. 
Because Houston was an interpretation of 
the federal rules, we are not bound by its 
holding. However, most states have consid-
ered Houston to be persuasive authority. 
See, e.g., Mayer v. State, 184 Ariz. 242, 908 
In a civil case in which an appeal is permitted 
by law as of right from a district court to a 
court of appeals the notice of appeal required 
by Rule 3 shall be filed with the clerk of the 
district court within 30 days after the date of 
entry of the judgment or order appealed 
from 
" * ™
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P.2d 56, 53 (Ct.App.1995); Commonwealth v. 
Hartsgrove, 407 Mass. 441, 553 N.E^d 1299, 
1302 (1990); Hickey v. Oregon State Peniten-
tiary, 127 OrApp. 727, 874 V2i 102, 105 
(1994). Similarly, in construing other proce-
dural rules, Utah courts have recognized that 
when the Utah rule "is essentially similar" to 
the federal rule of procedure, "in addition to 
applicable Utah cases, we look to the abun-
dant federal experience in the area for guid-
ance." Landes u Capital City Bank, 795 
P.2d 1127, 1130 (Utah 1990); see also Miller 
v. Brocksmith, 825 P.2d 690, 693 (Utah Ct. 
App.1992) (recognizing when a federal and 
state rule of procedure "are substantively 
identical, *we freely refer to authorities which 
have interpreted the federal rule'" (quoting 
Gold Standard, Inc. v, American Barrick 
Resources Corp., 805 P.2d 164, 168 (Utah 
1990))); State v. Pearson, 818 P.2d 581, 583 
(Utah Ct.App.1991) ("While this issue is one 
of first impression in this state, it has been 
addressed by the federal courts. We may 
look to federal cases in interpreting the rules 
when the Utah and, federal rales are identi-
cal."). 
Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a) 
provides: 
In a case .in. which, an appeal is permitted 
as a matter of right from the trial court to 
the appellate court, the notice of appeal 
required by rule 3 shall be filed with the 
clerk of the trial court within SO da.,ys after 
• date of entry of the judgment or order 
appealed from. 
(Emphasis added.) 
The plain language of Rule 4 provides that 
an appellant must file his or her notice of 
appeal in the district court within thirty days. 
When the language of a rule or statute is 
unambiguous, we have consistently held that 
a court must follow its plain meaning. See 
Salt Lake Child & Family Therapy Clinic, 
Inc. v. Frederick 890 P.2d 1017, 1020 (Utah 
1995) ("'When language is clear and unam-
biguous, it must be held to mean what it 
expresses, and no room is left for construc-
tion.'w (citation omitted)); Bonham v, Mor-
3. Federal Pule of Appellate procedure 4 was 
led in 1993 to reflect the prison delivery 
Thus, the prison delivery rule is now firmly 
established in the federal system. See Fed, 
R-App. P. 4(c) ("If an inmate confined in an 
ga% 788 P.2d 491 , 500 (Utah. 19891 iy.^ 
curiam) ("Unambiguous language in the ST.I 
ute may not be interpreted to contradir i.-. 
plain meaning."); Allred v. Utah Stau. • > 
tirement BdL, 914 P.2d 1172, 1175 (Utah O. 
App.1996) (concluding that "[u]nless statuto-
ry language is 'unreasonably confused, inop-
erable, []or in blatant contradiction to the 
express purpose of the statute,' this conr* 
applies the statute's literal wording" (citato*-
omitted) (alteration in original)), The--
we decline to stretch the plain meaning of 
Rule 4 to encompass the prison delivery rule. 
Our approach, is consistent with thai tak^. 
by other states faced with this issue, in 
Talley v. Diesslin, 908 P.2d 1173, 1175 (Colo. 
Ct.App.1995), the Colorado Court of Appeals 
refused to adopt the prison delivery rule in a 
case involving the timeliness of a prisoner's 
pro se complaint filed in district court, which 
sought review of a Department of Correc-
tion's disciplinary order. The court reasoned 
that if "the provision of the rule under con-
sideration is unambiguous, we must apply the 
plain meaning rule of statutory construction 
and construe the rule as written." Id. 
Therefore, the court concluded, the prison 
delivery rule was contrary to the plain Ian 
guage of its procedural rule. See id Also, 
in State ex ret Tyler v. Alexander, 52 Ohio 
St.3d 84, 555 N.E.2d 966, 967 (1990) (per 
curiam), the Ohio Supreme Court refused to 
adopt the prison, delivery rule, concluding the 
plain language of " 'filed in the court from 
which the case is appealed'" could not be 
construed to mean " 'delivered to the prison 
mail room,..7" 
Nevertheless, the reasoning of Houston 
and the policies underlying the prison deliv-
ery rule are compelling. If we were in a 
position to write appellate procedural rules, 
we might wel conclude a rule for pro se 
prisoners—such as the current Federal Rule 
of Appellate Procedure 4(c). which incorpo-
rates the prison i i iv^- r,fi»-3-—inakes 
sense. 
institution files a notice of appeal, in either a civil 
case or a criminal case, the notice of appeal is 
timely filed if it is deposited in the institution's 
internal mail system, on or before the last day for 
filing."). 
STATE v. PARKER 
Cite as 936 P.2d 1118 (UtahApp. 1997) 
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In holding the filing was timely, the Hous-
ton Court emphasized that an incarcerated 
pro se defendant's lack of control over the 
filing of his or her notice of appeal is unique. 
The Court's language is worth quoting at 
length: 
Such prisoners cannot take steps other 
litigants can take to monitor the process-
ing of their notices of appeal and to ensure 
that the court clerk receives and stamps 
their notices of appeal before the 30 day 
deadline. Unlike other litigants, pro se 
prisoners cannot personally travel to the 
courthouse to see that the notice is 
stamped "filed" or to establish the date on 
which the court received the notice. Other 
litigants may choose to entrust their ap-
peals to the vagaries of the mail and the 
clerk's process for stamping incoming pa-
pers, but only the pro se prisoner is forced 
to do so by his situation. And if other 
litigants do choose to use the mail, they 
can at least . . . follow [the notice's] prog-
ress by calling the court to determine 
whether the notice has been received and 
stamped, knowing that if the mail goes 
awry they can personally deliver notice at 
the last moment or that their monitoring 
will provide them with evidence to demon-
strate either excusable neglect or that the 
notice was not stamped on the date the 
court received it. Pro se prisoners cannot 
take any of these precautions; nor, by 
definition, do they have lawyers who can 
take these precautions for them. Worse, 
the pro se prisoner has no choice but to 
entrust the forwarding of his notice of 
appeal to prison authorities whom he can-
not control or supervise and who may have 
every incentive to delay. No matter how 
far in advance the pro se prisoner delivers 
his notice to prison authorities, he can 
4. The states adopting the prison delivery rule 
include Alabama, Arizona, California, Florida, 
Louisiana, Massachusetts, Nevada, Oklahoma, 
and Oregon. See Holland v. State, 621 So.2d 
373, 375 (Ala.Crim.App 1993); Mayer v. State, 
184 Ariz. 242, 908 P.2d 56, 59 (Ct.App.1995); In 
re Jordan, 4 Cal.4th 116, 13 Cal.Rptr.2d 878, 887, 
840 P.2d 983, 992 (1992); Haag v State, 591 
So.2d 614, 617 (Fla.1992); Tatum v. Lynn, 637 
So.2d 796, 799 (La.Ct.App 1994); Common-
wealth v. Hartsgrove, 407 Mass. 441, 553 N.E.2d 
1299, 1302 (1990); Kellogg v. Journal Communi-
cations, 108 Nev. 474, 835 P.2d 12, 13 (1992) 
never be sure that it will ultimately get 
stamped "filed" on time. 
Houston, 487 U.S. at 270-71, 108 S.Ct at 
2382. 
The Court noted "the rationale for con-
cluding that receipt constitutes filing in the 
ordinary civil case is that the appellant has 
no control over delays between the court 
clerk's receipt and formal filing of the no-
tice." Id at 273, 108 S.Ct. at 2383-84. In 
applying that rationale to the context of a pro 
se prisoner, the Court concluded the time of 
filing should be the moment at which the pro 
se prisoner loses control over and contact 
with the notice of appeal—i.e., at the moment 
of delivery to prison authorities. See id. at 
276,108 S.Ct. at 2385. 
Unskilled in law, unaided by counsel, and 
unable to leave the prison, [a pro se pris-
oner's! control over the processing of his 
notice necessarily ceases as soon as he 
hands it over to the only public officials to 
whom he has access—the prison authori-
ties. 
Id. at 271,108 S.Ct at 2382-83. 
Furthermore, the Court recognized that 
the rejection of the mailbox delivery rule in 
other contexts has been based, m part, on 
concerns of uncertainty over when filing oc-
curred. See id. at 275, 108 S.Ct at 2384. 
However, in the context of a pro se prisoner, 
there is not the same concern because a well-
run prison will invariably keep a log of outgo-
ing mail and/or date stamp the mail it re-
ceives from prisoners. Thus, the prison de-
livery rule is a bright-line rule." 487 U.S. at 
275,108 S.Ct. at 2385. 
We understand why many of our sister 
states have decided to adopt Houston's inter-
pretation of the federal rules to their own 
state rules of procedure.4 
(per cunam); Woody v State, 833 P.2d 257, 259 
(Okl.1992); Hickey v. Oregon State Penitentiary, 
127 Or.App. 727, 874 P.2d 102, 104-05 (1994). 
The states rejecting the prison delivery rule 
include Arkansas, Delaware, Montana, New 
York, Ohio, and Pennsylvania. See Key v. State, 
297 Ark. I l l , 759 SW.2d 567, 568 (1988) (per 
curiam); Can v. State, 554 A.2d 778, 780 (Del 
1989) (per curiam); O'Rourke v. State, 782 
S.W2d 808, 809 (Mo Ct.App.1990) (per curiam); 
Espinal v. State, 159 Misc.2d 1051, 607 N.Y.S.2d 
1008 (CtCl 1993); State ex ret Tyler v. Alexander, 
1 |2U 11tah 936 PACIFIC REPORTER, 2d SERIES 
However, we conclude adoption of such a 
rule exceeds our authority and should be left 
to our supreme court, which has the ultimate 
authority for drafting our rules of appellate 
procedure. See Talley, 908 P.2d at 1175 
(concluding "authority to adopt rules relative 
to review of decisions pursuant to [Colorado 
rules of procedure] is the sole function of [the 
state's] supreme court"); Turner v. Com-
monwealth, 137 Pa.Cmwlth. 609, 587 A.2d 48, 
49 (1991) ("Even if this Court 'wished to 
follow Houston, it has no authority to adopt a 
rule which is in direct contravention with ':i 
state appellate rule], a rule promulgated o,y 
our own Pennsylvania Supreme Court. Any 
such revision of that rule would have to come 
from the court which promulgated it.")-5 
52 Ohio St.3d 84, 555 N.E.2d 966, 967 (1990) 
(per curiam); Turner v. Commonwealth, 137 Pa. 
Cmwlth. 609, 587 A..2d 48, 49 (1991). 
5. We note 'that we do not reach 'the issue of 
whether our strict application of Rule 4 violates 
a pro se prisoner's due process or equal protec-
tion rights because these issues have not been 
sufficiently briefed and the record before us pre-
cludes an adequate exploration of these impor-
CONCLUSION 
VvY decline lo adopt Houston's prison de-
livery rule as it is not consistent with the 
plain language of Utah Rule of Appellate 
"wcedure 4. Therefore, we affirm our prior 
- • iin^ r dismissing defendant's appeal for lack 
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tant issues. See G <na p 2d 
1131, 1132 (Utah l l „ _ _ . _ , _ 4 1.2d 
599, 602 (Utah CtApp.1992). However, we note 
that other courts have found application of simi-
lar appellate procedural rules violated pro se 
prisoners' equal protection rights in certain cir-
cumstances. See People v. Slobodion, 30 Cal.2d 
362, 181 P.2d 868, 872 (1947); Haag, 591 So 2d 
at 617 
! 
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1160 (Utah CtApp.1994) (noting the protec-
tions of statutes of limitations). 
In refusing to allow the revival of time-
barred claims through retroactive application 
rf extended statutes of limitations, this court 
las chosen to follow the majority rule. See, 
z.g., Davis & McMillan v. Industrial Acd-
lent Comm'n, 198 Cal. 631, 246 P. 1046,1048 
1926); Corbett u General Eng'g & Mack 
?o., 160 Fla. 879, 37 So.2d 161, 162 (1948); 
tyitcaufsky v. Hatten, 353 Mo. 94, 182 
3.W.2d 86, 104 (1944), overruled on other 
irounds, Director of Depl of Revenue v. 
°arcels of Land Encumbered with Delin-
quent Tax Liens, 555 S.W.2d 293, 297 (Mo. 
977); Waldrop v. Hodges, 230 N.C. 370, 53 
!.E.2d 263, 265 (1949); Dunham v. Davis, 
29 S.C. 29, 91 S.E.2d 716, 718-19 (1956). 
[T]he great preponderance of authority fa-
ors the view that one who has become re-
used from a demand by the operation of the 
tatute of limitations is protected against its 
evival by a change in the limitation law." 51 
jn.Jur.2d Limitation of Actions § 44 (1970). 
accordingly, "after a cause of action has 
ecome barred by the statute of limitations 
le defendant has a vested right to rely on 
tat statute as a defense ... which cannot be 
iken away by legislation . . . or by affirma-
ve act, such as lengthening of the limitation 
*riod." Id. (emphasis added). 
Accordingly, we conclude that as of De-
»mber 1, 1976, when Roark turned eighteen 
sars old, she had one year within which she 
mid have brought a claim for assault and 
ittery and four years in which to bring her 
aim for intentional infliction of emotional 
stress. Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-12-25(3), 
!9(4). Any claims arising out of the alleged 
xual abuse had to be filed no later than 
member 1, 1980. Roark failed to do so. 
>nsequently, her claims are barred by the 
en-applicable statutes of limitations. Be-
use applying section 78-12-25.1 retroac-
ely to the present claim would affect Crab-
se's vested right to a defense of statute of 
litations, the effects of this section are not 
irely procedural, and therefore, this sec-
n cannot be applied retroactively. 
CONCLUSION 
3n the basis of the foregoing, we hold that 
i trial court correctly concluded that (1) 
any and all causes of action which Roark may 
have had were time barred no later than 
December 1, 1980, and (2) Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-12-25.1 cannot be applied retroactively 
to revive Roark's time-barred claims. Ac-
cordingly, we affirm. 
ZIMMERMAN, C.J., STEWART, 
Associate C.J., and HOWE and DURHAM, 
JJ., concur. 
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March 17, 1995. 
The Fourth District Court, Utah Coun-
ty, Boyd L. Park, J., extended and subse-
quently revoked defendant's probation. De-
fendant appealed, and his appeal was consoli-
dated with appeal of district court's denial of 
his habeas corpus petition. The Court of 
Appeals, 829 P.2d 150, affirmed denial of 
habeas petition, and remanded probation rev-
ocation order. On remand, the District 
Court, Sawaya, J., entered nunc pro tunc 
order extending probation, and Park, J., en-
tered nunc pro tunc order revoking defen-
dant's probation. Defendant appealed again. 
The Court of Appeals, Davis, Associate P.J., 
held that: (1) defendant was not given prop-
er notice of probation extension proceedings, 
and (2) defendant did not waive right to 
proper notice of proceedings. 
Reversed. 
Jackson, J., concurred in result 
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1. Constitutional Law <3=>270(5) 
Probationer shall be accorded due pro-
cess at revocation proceedings because re-
voking probation seriously deprives person of 
his or her liberty. U.S.C.A. ConstAmend. 
14; U.CA1953, 77-18-1 (1985). 
2. Constitutional Law <S=>270(5) 
Probationer is accorded measure of due 
process at probation extension proceeding 
and is thus entitled to available protections. 
U.S.C.A- ConstAmend. 14; U.CJL1953, 77-
18-l(10)(c) (1985). 
3. Constitutional Law <sx=>251.6 
"Sufficient notice" to satisfy require-
ments of due process is informing parties of 
specific issues which they must prepare to 
meet and giving parties reasonable opportu-
nity to know claims of opposing party and to 
meet them. U.S.CJL ConstAmend. 14. 
See publication Words and Phrases 
for other judicial constructions and def-
initions. 
4. Constitutional Law <S=>270(5) 
Criminal Law <3=>982.7 
Casual statement to probationer by aide 
at state hospital that extension proceedings 
regarding his probation were pending two 
days before hearing was not proper notice as 
required by due process for extension pro-
ceedings to have been properly initiated be-
fore original term of probation expired. 
U.S.CJL ConstAmend. 14; U.CJL1953, 77-
18-l(10)(e) (1985). 
5. Constitutional Law <3=»251.6 
Under due process clause, defendant is 
entitled to have adequate notice imparted to 
him, that he might make intelligent and in-
formed decision as to whether to waive his or 
her constitutional right to hearing. U.S.CA. 
ConstAmend. 14. 
6. Constitutional Law <3=>43(1) 
Criminal Law <e=>982.7 
Probationer did not knowingly waive his 
due process right to proper notice of issues 
before court and right to hearing by giving 
consent to extension of probation to judge 
after arriving at courthouse after hearing 
and receiving advice from former counsel, 
where probationer was not advised that for-
mer counsel had begin working as prosecut-
ing attorney, of effects of extension, of any 
possible alternatives, that he had right to 
proper notice of hearing, that he had right to 
hearing on matter, or that state failed to 
comply with probation extension statute. 
U.S.CA ConstAmend. 14; U.CJL1953, 77-
18-l(10)(c) (1985). 
7. Criminal Law <s*979(2) 
Trial court lost jurisdiction to initiate 
probation extension proceedings against pro-
bationer upon expiration of probation. 
U.S.CA ConstAmend. 14; U.CJL1953, 77-
18-l(10)(c) (1985). 
Steven B. Killpack, Margaret P. Lindsay 
(argued), Utah County Public Defender 
Ass'n, Provo, for appellant 
Todd A. Utzinger (argued), Asst Atty. 
Gen., Jan Graham, State Atty. Gen., Salt 
Lake City, for appellee. 
Before BILLINGS, Associate P.J., and 
DAVIS and JACKSON, JJ. 
OPINION 
DAVIS, Associate Presiding Judge: 
Defendant Rex Rawlings is before this 
court for the second time. Defendant is 
again appealing the trial court's initial order 
extending defendant's probation and its sub-
sequent order revoking defendant's proba-
tion and is consequently challenging the post-
remand proceedings. We reverse. 
FACTS 
On October 11, 1985, defendant pled guilty 
to a single count of attempted sodomy on a 
child, a first-degree felony, in violation of 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-403.1 (1985). De-
fendant was sentenced to five years to life in 
the Utah State Prison and placed on 18 
months probation. A condition of defen-
dant's probation was that he "enter and com-
plete the long-term sex offender program 
[program] at the Utah State Hospital." If 
defendant failed to complete the program, 
"then execution [would] enter on the prison 
sentence." Defendant also signed a proba-
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i agreement with Adult Probation & Pa-
s (AP & P) which included the condition 
t he complete the "sex offender program." 
roughout those proceedings, defendant 
3 represented by Sherry Ragan, a public 
ender. Although Ragan subsequently 
inged positions from public defender to 
inty prosecutor after the sentencing pro-
•dings were completed, she never with-
>w as defendant's counsel. 
Defendant's probation was to expire by 
^ration of law1 on May 6, 1987. On or 
rat April 13, 1987, AP & P generated a 
)artmental memorandum directed to the 
d court which stated that defendant "has 
>gressed favorably in the program, but . . . 
ids to continue in treatment"2 AP & P 
ommended that the court extend defen-
it's probation for an additional 18 months 
that he could complete the program. No 
tion was filed or made by the court or 
>secutor to extend defendant's probation.3 
wever, the court was apparently made 
are of the recommendation and a hearing 
s scheduled for April 17, 1987.4 Defen-
it received nothing in writing of any na-
•e from any source and learned of the 
aring when advised thereof casually by a 
spital aide two days before the hearing 
,e. 
\t the hearing (which was characterized 
the court as a "review"), Ragan appeared 
counsel for the State; defendant was nei-
Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1 (10)(a) (Supp 1985) 
irovided that "[u]pon completion without vioia-
lon of 18 months probation in felony cases, 
. . the offender shall be terminated from sen-
ence." Id. 
The memorandum did not comply with Utah 
:ode Ann § 77-18-1 (10)(b) (Supp.1985), which 
•rovided that "[t]he Department of Corrections 
hall notify the sentencing court in writing 30 
'ays in advance in all cases where termination of 
upervision will occur by law." Id. (emphasis 
dded). The memorandum was filed less than 
hirty days before the expiration of defendant's 
probation and also failed to inform the court that 
lefendant's probation period was about to termi-
tate by operation of law. 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-l(10)(c) (Supp.1985) 
•rovided that "[a]t any time prior to the termi-
Lation of probation the court may, after a hear-
cig with proper notice, upon its own motion or 
he motion of the prosecutor, extend probation for 
ther present nor represented by counsel. 
Ragan did not inform the court that she had 
initially represented the defendant at his sen-
tencing proceedings. Some time after the 
proceedings had terminated, Ragan met de-
fendant in the hall, told him the matter had 
already been heard and that his probation 
had been extended. Defendant claims that 
he asked Ragan whether the extension was 
in his best interest and she replied that it 
was.5 Ragan then proceeded to escort defen-
dant into the courtroom to speak to Judge 
Park6 and, in reliance on Ragan's advice, 
defendant acquiesced to the extension. The 
following minute entry, dated April 17, 1987, 
was made by the trial court: 
This matter came before the Court for 
review. Sherry Ragan, appeared as coun-
sel for the State of Utah. The defendant 
was not present nor represented by coun-
sel. 
The Court reviewed the recommendation 
of Adult Probation and Parole Dept. re-
questing defendant's probation [be] ex-
tended for eighteen months in order for 
defendant to complete the Utah State Hos-
pital Sex Offender Program. Court so 
ordered. 
and Later, Defendant appeared 
curred with the court's order. 
con-
Several months after his original term of 
probation would have expired, defendant 
good cause shown." Id. (emphasis added). 
Rule 12 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure 
requires that any motion "other than one made 
during a trial or hearing shall be in writing 
unless the court otherwise permits." In the case 
at bar, there was no motion, written or other-
wise, filed or made to extend defendant's proba-
tion, nor is there anything in the record to sug-
gest that the court's permission was obtained to 
waive die motion requirement. 
4. The April 13, 1987 memorandum from AP & P 
was not filed until April 21, 1987 The record 
does not reveal how the court received the rec-
ommendation from AP & P. 
5. Ragan does not deny making this statement, 
but only states that she does not remember mak-
ing it. 
6. Whether defendant actually spoke with Judge 
Park or the courtroom clerk is a contested issue. 
There is no transcript of what occurred. 
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twice appeared before the trial court7 at 
which time the court admonished defendant 
for violating the program rules and ordered 
that defendant remain in and cooperate with 
the program,8 On March 15, 1988, AP & P 
filed a motion for an order to show cause, 
accompanied by an affidavit, requesting that 
the court require defendant to show why his 
probation should not be revoked. The affida-
vit alleged that defendant had violated the 
conditions of his probation by not completing 
the program and, on this basis, the court 
should revoke defendant's probation and im-
pose the prison sentence. The order was 
issued by the trial court and the record 
reflects that defendant was properly served. 
A hearing on the order to show cause was 
held June 3, 1988. Defendant was present 
with counsel. Because defendant had failed 
to complete the program at the Utah State 
Hospital, a condition of his probation, the 
trial court ordered on July 8, 1988 that de-
fendant's probation be revoked and that his 
original sentence be imposed. Defendant ap-
pealed, arguing that the trial court lacked 
jurisdiction to revoke his probation because 
of procedural defects in his probation exten-
sion proceedings. However, because the tri-
al court's minute entry extending defendant's 
probation was unsigned, this court in State v. 
Rowlings, 829 P.2d 150,153 (Utah App.1992), 
determined that it lacked jurisdiction to con-
sider the issue. Thus, the case was remand-
ed for further proceedings to address both 
the propriety of the extension proceedings 
and the trial court's resulting jurisdiction 
over the revocation proceedings. 
On remand, evidentiary hearings on the 
propriety of the extension proceedings were 
commenced before Judge Park9 and conclud-
ed before Judge Sawaya.10 Judge Sawaya 
found that, while it was unclear whether 
defendant was notified in writing, defendant 
7. The dates of these hearings were November 6, 
1987 and February 5, 1988. 
8. At these proceedings, defendant was represent-
ed by his new attorney, Gary Weight 
9. The date of this hearing was February 12, 
1993 
10. Judge Park recused himself when it was de-
termined that he may be called as a witness with 
knew of the April 17, 1987 extension hearing 
and its purpose11 and, therefore, had ade-
quate and proper notice. Judge Sawaya fur-
ther concluded that, based on defendant's 
need for additional time to complete the long-
term sex offender program, a requirement of 
his probation, the court had good cause to 
extend defendant's probation. Thus, Judge 
Sawaya entered a nunc pro tunc order dated 
May 25, 1993 extending defendant's proba-
tion.12 
Defendant's probation revocation proceed-
ings were then returned to Judge Park so 
that the court could enter findings of fact and 
conclusions of law in support of the probation 
revocation order. Judge Park found that 
defendant had willfully violated the rules of 
the program and, hence, willfully violated the 
requirement of his probation agreement. As 
a result, a nunc pro tunc order dated Febru-
ary 3, 1994 was entered by Judge Park re-
voking defendant's probation. 
Defendant appeals both the propriety of 
the original extension proceedings and the 
subsequent revocation proceedings. 
ISSUE 
Although defendant raises several issues 
on appeal, we need reach only one: whether 
defendant's probation was properly extended 
on April 17, 1987, or whether defendant's 
probation had expired on May 6, 1987, leav-
ing the trial court without jurisdiction to 
revoke defendant's probation on July 8, 1988 
or conduct any further proceedings in an 
effort to remedy errors. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Whether the trial court had the authority 
to extend defendant's probation is a question 
of law. "[W]e accord a trial court's conclu-
respect to the April 17, 1987 extension proceed-
ings. 
11. The record of defendant's May 18, 1993 exten-
sion hearing supports a finding that defendant 
knew of the purpose of the hearing only after its 
conclusion and his discussion with Ragan. 
12. The "extension" hearing before Judge Sawaya 
was held on May 18, 1993, over six years from 
the date of the original extension proceedings. 
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>ns of law no particular deference, review-
s' them for correctness." State v Wilcox, 
8 P.2d 1028, 1031 (Utah 1991). 
ANALYSIS 
Defendant claims that the trial court 
jked the authority to extend his probation 
cause the April 17, 1987 proceedings were 
t conducted in accordance with the provi-
>ns of Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1 (Supp. 
85), and in particular, because he was not 
ran proper notice of the hearing.13 The 
ate responds that defendant received ade-
ate notice of the extension proceedings 
d, therefore, no procedural defects were 
esent which would have rendered the April 
, 1987 hearing ineffectual. The State con-
des, however, that had defendant not re-
ived proper notice of the hearing, the ex-
cision proceedings were not "properly initi-
sd prior to the end of his probation [and, 
erefore,] defendant would . . . be[ ] entitled 
a reversal of the 1988 order revoking his 
obation on the ground that the district 
urt lacked jurisdiction over the matter." 
[1] It is well settled that a probationer 
all be accorded due process at revocation 
oceedings because revoking probation seri-
sly deprives a person of his or her liberty. 
ignon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 782, 93 
Ct 1756, 1759-60, 36 L.Ed.2d 656 (1973); 
nith v. Cook, 803 P.2d 788, 795 (Utah 1990); 
ate v. Bonza, 106 Utah 553, 150 P.2d 970, 
2 (Utah 1944). What is less clear is wheth-
due process attaches to probation exten-
>n proceedings. Some courts have held, 
thout reference to any statutory law, that 
te process protections do not attach to pro-
ition extension proceedings. Even so, be-
use of the high risk of prejudice to the 
obationer when he or she is not given 
ttice of the extension hearing and the hear-
g is conducted ex parte, these courts have 
yoked their supervisory powers requiring 
e necessary parties to (1) give the proba-
>ner notice of the extension hearing; (2) 
tvise the probationer that he or she has a 
?ht to a hearing; and/or (3) advise the 
obationer that he or she has the right to 
• Defendant also claims that the trial court 
lacked the authority to extend his probation 
based on the absence of a proper motion before 
the assistance of counsel. Forgues v. United 
States, 636 F.2d 1125, 1127 (6th Cir.1980); 
United States v. Cornwell, 625 F.2d 686, 689 
(5th Cir.1980), cert, denied Cornwell II v. 
U.S., 449 U.S. 1066, 101 S.Ct 794, 66 
L.Ed.2d 610 (1980); Skipworth v. United 
States, 508 F.2d 598, 602-03 (3d Cir.1975). 
But see United States v. Carey, 565 F.2d 545, 
547 (8th Cir.1977), cert denied 435 U.S. 953, 
98 S.Ct. 1582, 55 L.Ed.2d 803 (1978). 
[2] We hold that a probationer in the 
State of Utah is accorded a measure of due 
process at a probation extension proceeding 
and is thus entitled to the available protec-
tions. The language contained in section 77-
18-1 provides that "[a]t any time prior to the 
termination of probation the court may, after 
a hearing with proper notice, . . . extend 
probation for good cause shown." Utah 
Code Ann. § 77-18-l(10)(c) (Supp.1985) (em-
phasis added). Thus, section 77-18-l(10)(c) 
creates an expectation on behalf of the pro-
bationer of notice of the extension proceed-
ings and a hearing, and it is this statutory 
expectation to which due process protections 
attach. See Board of Pardons v. Allen, 482 
U.S. 369, 381, 107 S.Ct. 2415, 2422, 96 
L.Ed.2d 303 (1987); Greenholtz v. Inmates of 
Nebraska Penal and Correctional Complex, 
442 U.S. 1, 11-12, 99 S.Ct. 2100, 2106, 60 
L.Ed.2d 668 (1979); cf Hatch v. Deland, 790 
P.2d 49, 51 (Utah App.1990), abrogated on 
other grounds by Labrum v. Board of Par-
dons, 870 P.2d 902 (Utah 1993). 
In Smith v. Cook, 803 P.2d 788 (Utah 
1990), the Utah Supreme Court addressed an 
issue analogous to the one before this court 
in the context of a revocation proceeding. In 
Smith, the plaintiff was convicted of forcible 
sodomy upon a child and was sentenced to a 
prison term of five years to life. Execution 
of the sentence was suspended, however, and 
the plaintiff was placed on three years proba-
tion. Three months before his probation ex-
pired, the plaintiff was again arrested and 
charged with two counts of sexual abuse of a 
child and sodomy upon a child. As a result 
of this arrest, an incident report and "affida-
the court, based on our holding, however, we 
need not separately address this issue. 
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vit to show cause" why the plaintiffs proba-
tion should not be revoked were filed with 
the court before the expiration of the defen-
dant's probation. However, the court did not 
order the plaintiff to show cause why his 
probation should not be revoked until after 
the plaintiffs original term of probation had 
expired. Thus, the plaintiff was first given 
notice of the probation revocation proceed-
ings after his probation had expired. At the 
hearing on the order to show cause, the 
plaintiffs probation was revoked and the 
prison sentence imposed. Id at 789. 
The plaintiff filed a petition for habeas 
corpus and argued that the trial court did not 
have the jurisdiction to revoke his probation 
because, ltbj the express terms of his proba-
tion order, his probation terminated prior to 
the time revocation proceedings were initi-
ated." Id. at 793. Thus, the supreme court 
addressed the issue of "whether probation 
can be revoked when the revocation proceed-
ing had been arguably initiated but not com-
pleted before the expiration of a judicially 
imposed probation period." Id 
The court held that trial courts are not 
statutorily required to complete revocation 
proceedings before the expiration of the pro-
bation period. Id at 794. The court rea-
soned that allowing revocation proceedings to 
continue after the expiration of the probation 
period when the proceedings are properly 
initiated does not subject probationers to the 
"danger of placing them 'in a state of perpet-
ual limbo[, where] although their probation 
would appear to have terminated . . . defen-
dants would actually be subject to a contin-
ued term of fictional supervision/ " Id at 
795 (quoting State v. Green, 757 P.2d 462, 464 
(Utah 1988)). The court then addressed the 
related issue of "which stage in the revoca-
tion proceedings must be reached within the 
period of probation for the court to retain its 
authority over probationers beyond the pro-
bation period." Id. at 794. 
The court in Smith began its analysis by 
looking at the applicable statutory law. The 
plaintiffs revocation proceedings were gov-
erned by Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-l(5)(a) 
(Supp.1981), which provided that probation 
may not be revoked "except upon a hearing 
in court and a finding that the conditions of 
probation have been violated." Id Further-
more, "[i]f the court determines that there is 
probable cause [to revoke a defendant's pro-
bation], it shall cause to be served on the 
defendant a copy of the affidavit and an 
order to show cause why his probation should 
not be revoked or modified." Id § 77-18-
l(5)(b). Because section. 77-18-l(5)(b) spe-
cifically provided that a probationer was to 
be served with an order to show cause why 
his or her probation should not be revoked or 
modified before a court could actually revoke 
or modify the probation, the court deter-
mined that "in order for a court to retain its 
authority over a probationer who is not ac-
tively evading supervision, the probationer 
must be served with the order to show cause 
within the period of probation." Smith, 803 
P.2d at 794. The probationer's right to no-
tice is necessary because "all parties con-
cerned would be aware of the proceedings 
. . . at the time the probation terminates. 
Probationers could also be assured that no 
new proceedings or proceedings under differ-
ent grounds could be brought against them 
once the probation period has ended." Id at 
795 (footnote omitted). Furthermore, the 
court felt that its holding was appropriate 
because it "g;uaranteefd1 the fundamental 
fairness embodied in the due process rtansp 
ot the United States nnnsHfaitfan fwhichl 
entitleLs] probationers to written notice of, 
the accusations against them." Id at 795. 
Kvttll though revocation proceedings were 
commenced well before the expiration of pro-
bation, because the plaintiff was not given 
notice of the revocation proceedings before 
the probation period expired, the court held 
that the trial, court lacked the authority to 
revoke the plaintiffs probation and his peti-
tion for habeas corpus was granted. Id at 
796. 
While Smith involved statutory prerequi-
sites to commencement of a probation revo-
cation proceeding, the same analysis is appli-
cable to statutory prerequisites to com-
mencement of probation extension proceed-
ings. As in Smith, this court must look to 
the applicable statute to determine "which 
stage in the [extension] proceedings must be 
reached within the period of probation for 
the court to retain its authority over proba-
STATE v. 
Cite as 893 P.2d V 
doners beyond the probation period." 
Smith, 803 P.2d at 794.14 
At the time relevant to this appeal, the 
pertinent parts of section 77-18-1 provided 
that 
(10)(a) Upon completion without viola-
tion of 18 months probation in felony . . . 
cases, . . . the offender shall be terminated 
from sentence, unless the person is earlier 
terminated by the court 
(b) The Department of Corrections shall 
notify the sentencing court in writing 30 
days in advance in all cases where termi-
nation of supervision will occur by law. 
The notification shall include a probation 
progress report 
(c) At any time prior to the termination 
of probation the court may, after a hearing 
with proper notice, upon its own motion or 
the motion of the prosecutor, extend pro-
bation for good cause shown, for one addi-
tional term of 18 months 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1 (Supp.1985). 
Thus, among other things, section 77-18-
1(10) specifically provides that the probation-
er is entitled to proper notice of the exten-
sion proceedings and a hearing before the 
court has the authority to extend probation. 
If no such notice is given and a hearing held, 
the court lacks the authority to extend the 
probation period because the trial court's 
discretion to extend probation "must be exer-
cised within the limits imposed by the legisla-
ture." Smith, 803 P.2d at 791. 
"Timely and adequate notice and an oppor-
tunity to be heard in a meaningful way are 
the very heart of procedural fairness." Nel-
son v. Jacobsen, 669 P.2d 1207, 1211 (Utah 
1983) (citations omitted); accord Plumb v. 
State, 809 P.2d 734, 743 (Utah 1990); W. & 
G. Co. v. Redevelopment Agency, 802 P.2d 
755, 761 (Utah App.1990). "[A]U parties are 
entitled to notice that a particular issue is 
being considered by a court and to an oppor-
tunity to present evidence and argument on 
that issue before decision." Plumb, 809 P.2d 
at 743. A defendant may be denied his or 
her right to due process under article I, 
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section 7, of the Utah Constitution if ade-
quate notice has not been given. Id.; see 
also Nelson, 669 P.2d at 1212 (notice is " '[a]n 
elementary and fundamental requirement of 
due process'") (quoting Mvllane v. Central 
Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 
314, 70 S.Ct. 652, 657, 94 L.Ed. 865 (1950)). 
" * "Many cases have held that where notice 
is ambiguous or inadequate to inform a party 
of the nature of the proceedings against him 
[or her] or not given sufficiently in advance 
of the proceeding to permit preparation, a 
party is deprived of due process."'" Plumb, 
809 P.2d at 743 (quoting Cornish Town v. 
Roller, 798 P.2d 753, 756 (Utah 1990) (quot-
ing Nelson, 669 P.2d at 1212)); accord W. & 
G. Co., 802 P2d at 762. 
[3] Sufficient notice is informing a party 
"of the specific issues which they must pre-
pare to meet" and giving the party a " 'rea-
sonable opportunity to know the claims of the 
opposing party and to meet them.'" W. & 
G. Co., 802 P.2d at 761 (emphasis added) 
(citations and quotation omitted). The Utah 
Supreme Court has set forth the well-estab-
lished requirements of adequate notice: 
"[N]otice [must be] reasonably calculated, 
under all the circumstances, to apprise in-
terested parties of the pendency of the 
action and afford them an opportunity to 
present their objections. The notice must 
be of such nature as reasonably to convey 
the required information, and it must af-
ford a reasonable time for those interested 
to make their appearance." 
Nelson, 669 P.2d at 1212 (quoting Mullane, 
339 U.S. at 314, 70 S.Ct. at 657). 
[4] In the case at bar, the uncontroverted 
evidence shows that defendant was not given 
proper notice of the extension proceedings. 
Defendant informally learned of the hearing 
through an aide at the Utah State Hospital, 
who apprised defendant wa couple of days 
before [he] was supposed to be there" that he 
needed to go to the courthouse for a "proba-
tion hearing," and that he was to go to Judge 
14. Although additional time to complete the pro-
gram is an adequate basis for extension of proba-
tion, it is noteworthy that, unlike the probationer 
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BaHif s courtroom at 10:00 a.m.15 At no time 
was defendant informed of the issues which 
were scheduled to be heard at the extension 
proceedings so that he could prepare to ad-
dress them. We conclude that a casual 
statement to a defendant two days before a 
hearing is inadequate to reach the level of 
"proper notice" as contemplated by section 
77-18-l(10)(c).16 
Notwithstanding the impropriety of the 
prehearing notice, the State suggests that, to 
the extent defendant was entitled to and 
denied due process, the events that occurred 
after the hearing constituted a consent to the 
proceedings and waiver of any due process 
claim, and that all of the events through 
defendants meeting with Judge Park consti-
tuted proper commencement of the extension 
proceedings. 
[5] It is true that a defendant may waive 
his or her constitutional right to due process. 
However, "[u]nder the due process clause, [a 
defendant is] entitled to have [adequate no-
tice] imparted to him [or her]; that he [or 
she] might make an intelligent and informed 
decision as to whether to waive his [or her] 
constitutional right to a . . . hearing." Wor-
raU u Ogden City Fire Dep% 616 P.2d 598, 
602 (Utah 1980). Thus, in order for defen-
dant to have effectively waived his due pro-
cess right to proper notice and a hearing on 
the extension issues, the waiver must be 
knowing. 
[6] When defendant arrived at the court-
house for the hearing, he met Ragan, whom 
he still believed to be his counsel. Ragan 
informed defendant that the proceedings had 
in Smith, Rawlings was not in default under the 
terms of the probation agreement. 
15. Which was partially incorrect. The proceed-
ings were actually before Judge Park, not before 
Judge Ballif. 
16. We note that an amendment to § 77-18-1, 
effective April 27, 1987, provided that before 
probation could be extended, the probationer 
was entided to a minimum of five days notice. 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-l(7)(c) (1987). It could 
be argued, therefore, that because the amend-
ment is procedural in nature, it can be applied 
retroactively, hence applying to the case at hand. 
See Smith v. Cook, 803 P.2d 788, 792 (Utah 
1990). 
been completed and that his probation had 
been extended. Defendant testified that he 
asked Ragan if the extension was in his best 
interest and Ragan replied that it was. Ra-
gan testified that she merely accompanied 
defendant into the courtroom to meet with 
Judge Park. Judge Park had no indepen-
dent recollection of the event. Ragan escort-
ed defendant back into the courtroom, where 
either the court clerk or the judge received 
defendant's consent to the extension. Al-
though Judge Sawaya made no specific find-
ing, it can be reasonably inferred that defen-
dant's consent to the extension was the result 
of either his confidence in, or the advice of, 
Ragan, the State's attorney with interests 
adverse to those of defendant. At no time 
was defendant advised of (1) the fact that 
Ragan represented the State and no longer 
represented defendant; (2) the effects of the 
extension; (3) the available alternatives, if 
any; (4) the fact that he had a right to 
proper notice of the hearing; (5) the fact that 
he had a light to a hearing on the matter; or 
(6) the failure of the State to otherwise com-
ply with the provisions of section 77-18-1. 
Based on these circumstances surrounding 
defendant's consent to the extension, it can-
not be said that he knowingly waived his due 
process right to proper notice of the issues 
before the court and the right to a hearing. 
[7] Of course the State could have 
remedied the defective proceedings by later 
properly commencing proceedings under sec-
tion 77-18-1, see State v. Jameson, 800 P.2d 
798, 802 (Utah 1990), as it purported to do 
some six years after the fact.17 However, in 
17. Relying on State v. Jameson, 800 P 2d 798 
(Utah 1990), the State contends that defendant 
received proper notice of the April 17, 1987 
hearing and that any procedural defects were 
remedied by the 1993 hearings before Judge Sa-
waya and Judge Park. Although the holding in 
Jameson seems to support the State's argument, 
it is facmally distinguishable from the case at 
hand. In Jameson, the defendant was taken into 
custody for violating the terms of his probation 
before the probation period expired. Id. at 803. 
At the time the defendant was taken mto custody, 
section 77-18-1(1 l)(a) provided that "[a]ny time 
spent in confinement awaiting a hearing or deci-
sion concerning revocation of probation does not 
constitute service of the term of probation except 
in the case of exoneration at the hearing." Utah 
Code Ann. § 77-18-1(1 l)(a) (Supp 1985) Thus, 
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accordance with the holding in Smith, a court 
loses jurisdiction over a probationer when 
probation extension proceedings are not 
properly commenced before the probation 
term expires. To properly commence proba-
tion extension proceedings, the provisions of 
section 77-18-1 must be complied with, par-
ticularly, proper notice of the hearing must 
be given or waived by the probationer. 
Smith, 803 ?2d at 794. Because neither 
occurred in this case, the proceedings were 
never properly commenced, the trial court 
lacked the authority to extend defendant's 
probation, and its attempt to do so on April 
17, 1987 is null and void. Further, because 
the failure to comply with section 77-18-1 
and accord defendant due process was not 
corrected before defendant's probation ex-
pired on May 6, 1987, the trial court lost 
jurisdiction over defendant and, therefore, 
any subsequent proceedings are also null and 
void.18 
CONCLUSION 
A trial court retains jurisdiction over a 
probationer after the probation period ex-
pires for the purpose of extension proceed-
ings if the proceedings are properly initiated 
before the probation period expires. In the 
case at bar, in order for extension proceed-
ings to have been properly initiated, Utah 
Code Ann. § 77-18-l(10)(e) (Supp.1985) re-
quires, among other things, that the proba-
tioner be given "proper notice." Proper no-
tice means informing a probationer of the 
issues which will be addressed at the exten-
sion hearing and giving the probationer ade-
quate time to address them. Because defen-
dant was not given proper notice of the pro-
bation extension hearing before the proba-
tion period expired and his subsequent meet-
ing with the trial judge did not constitute a 
the defendant's probation had not expired by 
operation of law, but was suspended when he 
was taken into custody, and it was for this reason 
that the court retained its jurisdiction over the 
defendant, not, as the State suggests, because the 
revocation proceedings were initiated before the 
expiration of the probation period. Any question 
of the trial court's jurisdiction to revoke proba-
tion after the probation period expires was ini-
tially and explicidy addressed in Cook, and it is 
that case upon which we rely. 
knowing waiver of this due process right, the 
trial court lacked the authority to extend 
defendant's probation. Further, because the 
defects were not corrected before defen-
dant's probation expired, the trial court lost 
jurisdiction over defendant to conduct any 
future hearings. Accordingly, we reverse 
both the 1988 and 1994 orders revoking de-
fendant's probation and conclude that defen-
dant's probation expired on May 6, 1987. 
BILLINGS, J., concurs. 
JACKSON, J., concurs in result 
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n for violation occurring after probation 
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Court of Appeals certified case. The 
erne Court, Howe, C.J., held that: (1) 
ation was properly extended by proba-
fs agreement to one-year extension and 
sr of personal appearance well before 
•ation date, and (2) waiver was knowing-
)luntarily and intelligently made. 
Affirmed. 
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To extend probationary period beyond 
riginai term, State must take definitive 
n to extend term before the expiration 
, and probationer must be given notice of 
intent U.C.A.1953, 77-18-l(12)(a)(i). 
riminal Law <s=>982.7 
Probation was properly extended by 
ationer's agreement to one-year exten-
and waiver of personal appearance on 
tision well before expiration date, even 
gh State did not initiate extension pro-
he parties disagree on the date when Call's 
>bation began Call asserts that it began on 
nl 3, 1992, the day the court orally sentenced 
n. The State, however, relies on State v. 
ceedings prior to that date, as probationer 
had actual notice that his term of probation 
would not expire at conclusion of statutory 
36-month period. U.CA1953, 77-18-
K12)(a)(i). 
3. Criminal Law <3=>982.7 
Probationer knowingly, intelligently, and 
voluntarily waived his right to hearing on 
issue of whether his probation should be 
extended by signing waiver form that in-
formed him of his right to appear and to be 
represented by counsel, as defendant was 
competent, read from, able to read form, and 
had reasonable understanding of proceed-
ings. U.CJU953, 77-18-l(12)(a)(i). 
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sen, Asst. Att'y Gen., Salt Lake City, for 
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HOWE, Chief Justice: 
f 1 Defendant Leslie J. Call appealed to 
the Utah Court of Appeals from a district 
court order revoking his probation and or-
dering him to serve his sentence of two con-
current prison terms. However, after oral 
argument, but before rendering a decision, 
the court of appeals certified it to us pursu-
ant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(3) and rule 
43 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
BACKGROUND 
H 2 On November 15, 1991, Call pleaded 
gwlty to one count of burglary and one count 
of attempted forcible sexual abuse, both third 
degree felonies. The trial court sentenced 
him to serve two concurrent terms of zero to 
five years in prison but then suspended his 
sentence and placed him on probation for a 
period of three years. Although the court 
orally sentenced Call on April 3, 1992, it did 
not enter the written judgment and sentence 
until April 8,1992.1 
Anderson, 797 P.2d 1114 (Utah Ct.App.1990), to 
argue that Call's probationary period did not 
begin until April 8, 1992, the day the court 
signed and entered the written judgment. 
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f 3 One of the terms of Call's probation 
required him to enter and complete a sex 
offender treatment program. He entered 
such a program but was unable to complete it 
by April 1995 when his probation would have 
initially terminated. On March 20, 1995, at 
the request of his probation officer, Call 
signed a "Waiver of Personal Appearance 
Before the Court," wherein he waived his 
right to a hearing and agreed to extend his 
probation for one more year so that he could 
complete his treatment program. See Utah 
Code Ann. § 77-18-1 (12)(a)(i). On April 5, 
1995, the Utah State Department of Correc-
tions, Adult Probation and Parole ("AP & P") 
filed the signed waiver and a progress/viola-
tion report with the trial court and formally 
requested a one-year extension of Call's pro-
bation. The court granted the extension that 
same day. 
114 Shortly after the extension of Call's 
probation, AP & P filed a second progress/vi-
olation report with the court which alleged 
that Call had been arrested and charged with 
residential burglary, criminal mischief, and 
assault. These charges arose from an inci-
dent in which Call allegedly broke into his 
ex-girlfriend's home, smashed several pieces 
of property, and physically assaulted her 
thirteen-year-old son. On April 28, 1995, the 
court revoked Call's probation but then rein-
stated it for another year with additional 
conditions. 
15 On March 28, 1996, AP & P filed a 
third progress/violation report with the court. 
Although the report alleged that Call had 
violated his probation by failing to enter 
aftercare for the purpose of monitoring his 
ingestion of antabuse, failing to report to AP 
& P for one month, resuming to live with his 
ex-girlfriend, and consuming alcohol, it did 
not seek a revocation of his probation. Rath-
er, the report requested a second extension 
of Call's probation so that he could complete 
his sex offender treatment program. In ad-
dition to the progress/violation report, AP & 
P filed a waiver of personal appearance that 
Call had signed, wherein he again waived his 
right to a hearing and requested another 
extension of his probation. The court grant-
ed the request and extended Call's probation 
for one more year. 
f 6 In July 1996, AP & P filed a fourth 
progressAiolation report with the court 
This report alleged that Call had been ar-
rested and charged with sexual abuse of a 
child, intoxication, and interfering with an 
arresting officer. The victim's father had 
reported to police that he found Call naked 
from the waist down and in bed with the two-
year-old victim. In light of these allegations, 
the court issued a bench warrant and an 
order to show cause, ordering Call to appear 
and show why his probation should not be 
revoked. 
117 While the hearing on the order to 
show cause was pending, Call moved to dis-
miss. He asserted for the first time that the 
court's "jurisdiction over [his] case terminat-
ed on April 3,1995," two days before AP & P 
sought to extend it the first time by filing the 
progressAiolation report and signed waiver 
of personal appearance with the court on 
April 5, 1995. He maintained that the court 
therefore lacked the authority to revoke his 
probation and that the court should dismiss 
the pending revocation proceedings. The tri-
al court denied the motion and ultimately 
revoked Call's probation on December 11, 
1996. CaJl now appeals. 
118 Call contends that "[pjursuant to 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1 (Supp.1996), felo-
ny probation terminates by [operation ofl law 
after 36 months unless the probation period 
is tolled or the trial court acts to extend 
probation during the probation period." He 
relies on the following subsections, which 
provide in relevant part: 
(10)(a)(i) Probation may be terminated 
at any time at the discretion of the court 
or upon completion without violation of 36 
months [of] probation 
(H)(1)) The running of the probation pe-
riod is tolled upon the filing of a violation 
report with the court alleging a violation of 
the terms and conditions of probation or 
upon the issuance of an order to show 
cause or warrant by the court 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-l(10)(a)(i) & 
(ll)(b). Call argues that since AP & P failed 
to file the progress/violation report or other-
wise initiate the extension proceedings prior 
STATE 
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ril 3,1995, his probation period was not 
but terminated as a matter of law. 
so contends that he did not "knowingly, 
gently and voluntarily waive his right 
hearing on the issue of whether [his] 
ttion should be extended." He thus 
ides that even if AP & P had filed the 
r and progress/violation report before 
jobation terminated, the waiver was 
theless ineffective in extending his pro-
i. We will consider these two conten-
in order. 
ANALYSIS 
Over the past eleven years, we have 
•ccasion to decide two significant cases 
ig with the termination of probation. 
i first case, State v. Green, 757 P.2d 462 
i 1988), we held that the trial court did 
ave authority to revoke a defendant's 
tion after the probationary period had 
3d by operation of law pursuant to sec-
r7-18-l(10)(a), which at that time pro-
for automatic termination of probation 
eighteen months with no probation vio-
. In that case, after the eighteen-
1 probationary period had expired, a 
tion officer discovered that the defen-
was being charged with committing 
offenses during the eighteen-month 
jory term of his probation. The officer 
an affidavit of probation violation with 
ial court, and after a hearing, the court 
ed the defendant to serve a prison term 
s original conviction. We reversed the 
sending him to prison and pointed out 
idefiniteness the trial court's ruling cre-
endants would be left in a perpetual 
£ of limbo; although their probation 
ild appear to have been terminated, 
ally by entry of an order to that effect, 
endants would actually be subject to a 
tinued term of fictional supervision . 
iades could pass and then, based upon 
discovery of a probation violation 
ch had occurred during the statutory 
iod, a court could revoke a term of 
bation thought to have been terminated 
?ago. 
464. 
) Two years later, in Smith v. Cook, 
•2d 788 (Utah 1990), the defendant was 
v. CALL Utah 203 
201 (Utah 1999) 
on probation for a three-year period, starting 
on July 10, 1981, and ending July 9, 1984. 
Three months prior to the completion of his 
probation, the defendant was again arrested 
and charged with a crime. On May 15, 1984, 
an incident report and affidavit to show cause 
why his 1981 probation should not be re-
voked or modified was filed in the district 
court Five months later, in December 1984, 
the court revoked his probation and ordered 
him to serve his sentence. We reversed the 
revocation, holding that in order for a trial 
court to retain its authority over the proba-
tioner beyond the period of probation, the 
probationer must be served with an order to 
show cause within the probationary period. 
See Smith, 803 P.2d at 796. 
[1, 2] H 11 These rases ^str-j^t that if it 
is the intent, nf tfrp fttate tn eyf-end the proba-
tionary period bevond its original term, the 
State must take definitive action to extend 
the term before the expiration date, and the 
probationer must be given notice of that 
intent. Otherwise, the probationer is left in 
a state of uncertainty, not knowing whether 
to continue to observe the terms of his pro-
bation. In the instant case, a probation offi-
cer approached Call well in advance of the 
termination date and requested that he agree 
to a one-year extension of his probation so 
that he could complete the sex offender 
treatment program in which he was enrolled, 
thus fulfilling one of the terms of his proba-
tion. On March 20,1995, Call signed a waiv-
er of personal appearance, wherein he waived 
his right to a hearing and agreed to an 
extension of his probation for one more year. 
This action confirmed that Call received actu-
al notice that his term of probation would not 
expire at the conclusion of the statutory 36-
month period. Thus Call's probation was 
properly extended under section 77-18-
l(12)(a)(i), which provides: "Probation may 
not be modified or extended except upon 
waiver of a hearing by the probationer or 
upon a hearing and a finding in court that 
the probationer has violated the conditions of 
probation." (Emphasis added.) 
112 We conclude that Call acted to ex-
tend his probation for one year well in ad-
vance of the expiration of the original term 
C\Tt A* 
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and left him with no doubt that he remained 
obligated to the terms of his probation for 
another year. See State v. Martin, 976 P.2d 
1224 (Utah CtApp.1999) (holding that under 
section 77-18-1 (12)(a)(i), probation may be 
extended in either of two ways provided for 
in that subsection). Since Call signed the 
written waiver well before both April 3,1995, 
and April 8, 1995, it is immaterial for the 
purposes of this case on which of those two 
dates his original term of probation would 
have expired. 
[3] U13 Call also contends that he did 
not "knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily 
waive his right to counsel, notice and a hear-
ing on the extension issue." He has admit-
ted, however, that he signed the waiver and 
that he was competent and able to read the 
words on the form before he signed it. Call 
did not testify at the hearing on his motion to 
dismiss t t e oxter \& stao^ rame 'wrr? VAs 
probation should be revoked The record on 
this issue consists solely of the uncontradict-
ed testimony of his probation officer and the 
written waiver. 
1114 The probation officer testified that 
on March 20, 1995, he met with Call and 
discussed the probation conditions Call had 
not met and the possibility of an extension. 
Call did not object to extending his probation 
and did not ask for an attorney before mak-
ing that decision. He read the waiver form 
and asked no questions before he signed it. 
The form stated that Call was willing to 
accept the extension of his probation without 
a hearing and acknowledged his right to be 
present at a hearing and to be represented 
by counsel. In State v Byington, 936 P.2d 
1112,1116 (Utah CtApp.1997), the court held 
that a probationer in a probation revocation 
bearing can waive tiie right to counsel "as 
long as the record as a whole reflects the 
probationer's reasonable understanding of 
the proceedings and awareness of the right 
to counsel." Under that standard, the writ-
ten waiver corroborated by both the proba-
tion officer's testimony and Call's admission 
established that Call had a reasonable under-
standing of the proceedings and an aware-
ness of his right to counsel. In denying 
Call's motion to dismiss, the trial court deter-
mined that Call knew what he was signing, 
wa£ competent, and understood and could 
read the document that he signed. The trial 
court did not err in this regard. 
115 We conclude that the record fully 
supports that Call knowingly, intelligently, 
and voluntarily waived his right to a hearing 
on the issue of whether liis probation should 
be extended. This conclusion is bolstered by 
the fact that one year later, in March 1996, 
Call again executed a "Waiver of Personal 
Appearance Before the Court" and requested 
another extension of his probation. 
116 Order affirmed. 
117 Associate Chief Justice DURHAM, 
Justice STEWART, Justice ZIMMERMAN, 
and Justice RUSSON concur in Chief Justice 
HOWE'S opinion. 
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STARWAYS, INC., Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v. 
Wesley D. CURRY and Bobbi Chase, aka 
Roberta A Chase, dba Curry & Chase 
Marketing, Defendants and Appellants. 
No. 980025. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
May 18, 1999. 
Nevada corporation which had its princi-
pal place of business in Utah brought suit 
agatfist Canlorma residents ddmg business Y& 
California for libel and intentional interfer-
ence with existing and prospective business 
advantage. California residents moved to dis-
miss for lack of personal jurisdiction The 
Fourth District Court, Utah County, Fred D. 
Howard, J., denied motion, and California 
residents took interlocutory appeal The Su-
preme Court, Durham, Associate Chief 
Judge, held that* (1) defendants failed to 
specifically controvert jurisdictional allega-
tions of complaint; (2) complaint allegations 
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IN THE 3RD DISTRICT - SALT LAKE CITY COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
IN AND FOR THE STATE OF UTAH 
CHE STATE OF UTAH 
VS 
ORR, David Jay 
Plaintiff, 
Defendant, 
ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE 
COURT CASE NO: 001902772 
JUDGE: Timothy R-Hanson 
DEF ATTY: Larry R. Keller 
UPON A READING of the Affidavit in Support of Order to Show Cause, the Court finds 
probable cause to believe that the defendant in this matter has violated the terms and conditions 
of his/her probation as set forth in the Affidavit, and that revocation or modification of 
defendant's probation is justified. 
IT IS ORDERED that the defendant appear before the Honorable Timothy R. Hanson, 
Judge of the above-entitled Court, at the Judge's courtroom in SALT LAKE, Utah, on the 
day of Ijfajt* 2C!^j at the hour of ff^^then and there to show cause why probation 
of said defendant should -K>t be revoked or modified by the Court based upon the allegations 
contained in the Affidavi; on file with the Court. 
-E: ORR, David Jay 
-2-
The defendant has a right to be represented by counsel at the above-described hearing and 
to have appointed to represent the defendant if the defendant is indigent. The defendant also has 
a right to present evidence as provided in the Utaji Rules of Civil Procedure. 
DATED THIS IZJ_ day of V^UA 20j2."^> 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that this Order to Show Cause and Affidavit in support thereof, was 
personally served upon trie defendant at <^>r\Kr >lff [A- (tffrf^^jf .oy showing the 
original and informing the defendant of its contents, and delivering a copy on the I^J day of 
M f t V 20QJ; additional copies were delivered to /yUftn J^TfMJJt^f \ counsel for 
the defendant, on the _J_ Q day of Aljfaf 20^J 
ROBERT EGEL1 PROBATION OFFICER 
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3RD DISTRICT COURT - SALT LAKE 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH vs. DAVID J ORR 
CASE NUMBER 001902772 State Felony 
CHARGES 
Charge 1 - 61-1-1 - SECURITIES FRAUD 
3rd Degree Felony 
Disposition: March 23, 2000 Dismissed 
Charge 2 - 61-1-1 - SECURITIES FRAUD 
3rd Degree Felony 
Disposition: March 23, 2000 Dismissed 
Charge 3 - 61-1-1 - SECURITIES FRAUD 
2nd Degree Felony 
Disposition: March 23, 2000 Dismissed 
Charge 4 - 61-1-1 - SECURITIES FRAUD 
2nd Degree Felony 
Disposition: March 23, 2000 Dismissed 
Charge 5 - 61-1-1 - SECURITIES FRAUD 
2nd Degree Felony 
Disposition: March 23, 2000 Dismissed 
Charge 6 - 61-1-1 - SECURITIES FRAUD 
2nd Degree Felony 
Disposition: March 23, 2000 Dismissed 
Charge 7 - 61-1-1 - SECURITIES FRAUD 
2nd Degree Felony 
Disposition: March 23, 2000 Dismissed 
Charge 8 - 61-1-1 - ATTEMPTED SECURITIES FRAUD (amended) 
3rd Degree Felony Plea: March 23, 2000 Guilty 
Disposition: March 23, 2000 {Guilty Plea} 
Charge 9 - 61-1-1 - SECURITIES FRAUD 
2nd Degree Felony 
Disposition: March 23, 2000 Dismissed 
Charge 10 - 61-1-1 - SECURITIES FRAUD 
3rd Degree Felony 
Disposition: March 23, 2000 Dismissed 
Charge 11 - 61-1-1 - SECURITIES FRAUD 
3rd Degree Felony 
Disposition: March 23, 2000 Dismissed 
Charge 12 - 61-1-1 - SECURITIES FRAUD 
3rd Degree Felony 
Disposition: March 23, 2000 Dismissed 
Charge 13 - 76-10-1801 - COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD 
2nd Degree Felony 
Disposition: March 23, 2000 Dismissed 
Charge 14 - 76-10-1801 - COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD 
2nd Degree Felony 
Disposition: March 23, 2000 Dismissed 
Charge 15 - 61-1-3 - UNREGISTERED SECURITIES AGENT 
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3rd Degree Felony 
Disposition: March 23, 2000 Dismissed 
Charge 16 - 61-1-3 - UNREGISTERED SECURITIES AGENT 
3rd Degree Felony 
Disposition: March 23, 2000 Dismissed 
Charge 17 - 61-1-3 - UNREGISTERED SECURITIES AGENT 
3rd Degree Felony 
Disposition: March 23, 2000 Dismissed 
Charge 18 - 61-1-3 - UNREGISTERED SECURITIES AGENT 
3rd Degree Felony 
Disposition: March 23, 2000 Dismissed 
Charge 19 - 61-1-3 - UNREGISTERED SECURITIES AGENT 
3rd Degree Felony 
Disposition: March 23, 2000 Dismissed 
Charge 20 - 61-1-3 - UNREGISTERED SECURITIES AGENT 
3rd Degree Felony Plea: March 23, 2000 Guilty 
Disposition: March 23, 2000 {Guilty Plea} 
Charge 21 - 61-1-3 - UNREGISTERED SECURITIES AGENT 
3rd Degree Felony 
Disposition: March 23, 2000 Dismissed 
Charge 22 - 61-1-3 - UNREGISTERED SECURITIES AGENT 
3rd Degree Felony 
Disposition: March 23, 2000 Dismissed 
Charge 23 - 61-1-3 - UNREGISTERED SECURITIES AGENT 
3rd Degree Felony 
Disposition: March 23, 2000 Dismissed 
Charge 24 - 61-1-3 - UNREGISTERED SECURITIES AGENT 
3rd Degree Felony 
Disposition: March 23, 2000 Dismissed 
Charge 25 - 61-1-3 - UNREGISTERED SECURITIES AGENT 
3rd Degree Felony 
Disposition: March 23, 2000 Dismissed 
Charge 26 - 61-1-3 - UNREGISTERED SECURITIES AGENT 
3rd Degree Felony 
Disposition: March 23, 2000 Dismissed 
Charge 27 - 76-10-1603 - PATTERN OF UNLAW ACTIVITY 
2nd Degree Felony 
Disposition: March 23, 2000 Dismissed 
Charge 28 - 7 6-10-1603 - PATTERN OF UNLAW ACTIVITY 
2nd Degree Felony 
Disposition: March 23, 2000 Dismissed 
CURRENT ASSIGNED JUDGE 
TIMOTHY R. HANSON 
PARTIES 
Defendant - DAVID J ORR 
Represented by: LARRY R. KELLER 
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Plaintiff - STATE OF UTAH 
Represented by: HOWARD R LEMCKE 
DEFENDANT INFORMATION 
Defendant Name: DAVID J ORR 
Date of Birth: February 27, 1961 
Jail Booking Number: 
Law Enforcement Agency: SECURITIES DIVISION 
LEA Case Number: 
Prosecuting Agency: SALT LAKE COUNTY 
Agency Case Number: DAO 00003211 
Sheriff Office Number: 
Violation Date: December 07, 1994 SL COUNTY 
ACCOUNT SUMMARY 
TOTAL REVENUE Amount Due: 
Amount Paid: 
Credit: 
Balance: 
606.75 
606.75 
0.00 
0.00 
REVENUE DETAIL - TYPE: FINE 
Original Amount Due: 1,850.00 
Amended Amount Due: 288.53 
Amount Paid: 288.53 
Amount Credit: 0.00 
Balance: 0.00 
Account Adjustments 
Date Amount Reason 
Nov 23, 2002 -1,561.47 Accounts Receivable accounted 
for by Adult Probation and Parole. Any outstanding payments 
should be made to AP&P. 
REVENUE DETAIL - TYPE: INTEREST 
Amount Paid: 
Amount Credit: 
Balance: 
Account Adjustments 
Date 
Jul 30, 2002 
REVENUE DETAIL - TYPE: COP" 
Amount Due: 
Amount Paid: 
Amount 
311.47 
FEE 
311.47 
0.00 
0.00 
Reason 
Interest Posted to Date 
6.75 
6.75 
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Amount Credit: 
Balance: 
0.00 
0.00 
CASE NOTE 
DAO 00003213 
PROCEEDINGS 
02-11-00 Case filed 
02-11-00 Note: CASE FILED BY DAVID WAYMENT UT DIV OF SECURITIES. DEF 
NON-JAIL. WARRANT ACTIVATED. 
02-11-00 Warrant ordered on: February 11, 2000 Warrant Num: 972102725 
Bail Allowed 
Bail amount: 
02-11-00 Warrant issued on 
Bail Allowed 
Bail amount: 
Judge: PAT B 
Issue reason 
50000.00 
February 11, 2000 Warrant Num: 972102725 
50000.00 
BRIAN 
Based on the probable cause statement. 
02-14-00 Note: deft will surrender with larry keller 
02-14-00 SURRENDER scheduled on February 15, 2000 at 09:30 AM in 
Arraignment - S31 with Judge ARRAIGNMENT. 
02-14-00 Judge ARRAIGNMENT assigned. 
02-14-00 ARRAIGNMENT Cancelled. 
02-14-00 ARRAIGNMENT scheduled on February 15, 2000 at 09:30 AM in 
Arraignment - S31 with Judge ARRAIGNMENT. 
02-15-00 ROLL CALL scheduled on March 02, 2000 at 02:00 PM in To Be 
Determined with Judge ATHERTON. 
02-15-00 Minute Entry - Minutes for Initial Appearance 
Judge: RAYMOND S. UNO 
PRESENT 
Clerk: barbarrs 
Prosecutor: LEMCKE, HOWARD R 
Defendant 
Defendant's Attorney(s 
Video 
Tape Number: 
KELLER, LARRY 
73 Tape Count: 900 
INITIAL APPEARANCE 
Defendant waives reading of Information. 
Defendant is arraigned. 
ROLL CALL is scheduled. 
Date: 03/02/2000 
Time: 02:00 p.m. 
Location: To Be Determined 
Third District Court 
450 South State 
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Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Before Judge: JUDITH S. ATHERTON 
02-15-00 Note: INITIAL APPEARANCE minutes modified. 
02-15-00 Warrant recalled on: February 15, 2000 Warrant num: 972102725 
Recall reason: Based on Court order 
02-15-00 Note: MOTION OF HOWARD LEMCKE FOR STATE COURT ORDER WARRANT 
RECALLED. DEFENDANT NOTIFIED AS BY SUMMONS BY NOTIFYING 
ATTORNEY LARRY KELLER . 
02-15-00 Note: REQUEST OF HOWARD LEMCKE CASE SET ON REGULAR ROLL CALL 
AND IF REQUIRED LATER CASE TO BE SET ON SPECIAL SETTING. 
02-18-00 Note: Bail remain $250,000 
03-02-00 Minute Entry - Minutes for Roll Call 
Judge: RAYMOND S. UNO 
PRESENT 
Clerk: terryb 
Prosecutor: HOWARD LEMCKE 
Defendant 
Defendant's Attorney(s): LARRY KELLAR 
Interpreter: 
Video 
Tape Count: off record 
HEARING 
Roll continued to 3/23 due to Plea Negotiations. 
ROLL CALL. 
Date: 3/23/2000 
Time: 02:00 p.m. 
Location: To Be Determined 
Third District Court 
450 South State 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Before Judge: ROGER A. LIVINGSTON 
03-06-00 Note: ROLL CALL calendar modified. 
03-06-00 ROLL CALL scheduled on March 23, 2000 at 02:00 PM in To Be 
Determined with Judge LIVINGSTON. 
03-06-00 Note: JUDGE UNO TOOK THE BENCH FOR JUDGE ATHERTON 
03-23-00 Judge HANSON assigned. 
03-23-00 SENTENCING scheduled on May 12, 2000 at 09:00 AM in Fourth 
Floor - N4 5 with Judge HANSON. 
03-23-00 Note: Case Bound Over 
03-23-00 Minute Entry - Minutes for Change of Plea 
Judge: ROGER A. LIVINGSTON 
PRESENT 
Clerk: terryb 
Prosecutor: HOWARD LEMCKE 
Defendant 
Defendant's Attorney(s): LARRY KELLAR 
Printed: 04/14/04 09:59:57 Page 5 
CASE NUMBER 001902772 State Felony 
Video 
Tape Number: video Tape Count: 2.37 
Defendant waives the reading of the Information. 
Court advises defendant of rights and penalties. 
Defendant waives time for sentence. 
A pre-sentence investigation was ordered. 
The Judge orders Adult Probation & Parole to prepare a Pre-sentence 
report. 
Upon states motion, Amend Count 8 to F3 - Attempted Securities 
Fraud. Defendant will plead guilty to amended count and Count 20 
as charged. All remaining counts will be dismissed. 
CASE BOUNDOVER 
Defendant waived preliminary hearing, State consenting thereto. 
This case is bound over. A Sentencing has been set on 5/12/00 at 
09:00 AM in courtroom N45 before Judge TIMOTHY R. HANSON. 
03-23-00 Note: CHANGE OF PLEA minutes modified. 
05-12-00 Tracking started for Probation. Review date May 12, 2003. 
05-12-00 Fine Account created Total Due: 1850.00 
05-12-00 Minute Entry - Minutes for SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITME 
Judge: TIMOTHY R. HANSON 
PRESENT 
Clerk: evelynt 
Prosecutor: HOWARD R LEMCKE 
Defendant 
Defendant's Attorney(s): LARRY R. KELLER 
Video 
Tape Number: 5/12/00 Tape Count: 9:23/10:09 
SENTENCE PRISON 
Based on the defendant's conviction of ATTEMPTED SECURITIES FRAUD a 
3rd Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate 
term of not to exceed five years in the Utah State Prison. 
The prison term is suspended. 
Based on the defendant's conviction of UNREGISTERED SECURITIES 
AGENT a 3rd Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an 
indeterminate term of not to exceed five years in the Utah State 
Prison. 
The prison term is suspended. 
SENTENCE PRISON CONCURRENT/CONSECUTIVE NOTE 
These sentences are to run consecutively. 
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SENTENCE FINE 
Charge # 8 Fine: $5000.00 
Suspended: $4500.00 
Surcharge: $425.00 
Due: $925.00 
Charge # 20 Fine: $5000.00 
Suspended: $4500.00 
Surcharge: $425.00 
Due: $925.00 
Total Fine: $10000.00 
Total Suspended: $9000.00 
Total Surcharge: $850.00 
Total Principal Due: $1850.00 
Plus Interest 
ORDER OF PROBATION 
The defendant is placed on probation for 3 year(s). 
Probation is to be supervised by Adult Probation & Parole. 
Defendant is to pay a fine of 1850.00 where the surcharge has been 
added to the fine. Interest may increase the final amount due. 
Pay fine to The Court. 
PROBATION CONDITIONS 
Usual and ordinary conditions required by the Department of Adult 
Probation & Parole, 
Violate no laws. 
Pay restitution as determined by Probation Officer. 
Serve 6 months in the Salt Lake County Jail, as a term of 
probation, no credit for time served. Commitment is to issue 
forthwith 
Restitution is to be determined. Defendant is to pay no less than 
$1,000 per month towards restitution, or 25% of income, under 
direction of APP. Restitution hearing may be set upon appropriate 
application. 
Have no contact with victims. 
Not be involved in activities in which involves other persons 
money, investment, or involving financial account. 
06-21-00 Fee Account created Total Due: 311.47 
08-02-00 Filed: Letter to Court from Bruce Bartlett 
08-09-00 Filed: Letter from Court dated 8/8/00 to Bruce Bartlett 
09-05-00 Filed: Memo from Bruce Bartlett to Court re: defendant, date 
mailed 8/14/00 
09-13-00 Filed: Letter to Mr. & Mrs Ward from the Court, dated 9/12/00 
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09-13-00 Filed: Letter to court from Wards, dated 8/31/2000 
12-05-
12-13-
01-02-
01-02-01 
01-02-
01-02-
01 
01 
01-12-
01-12-
00 Filed: Letter to Court from Thomas J. Million, D.M.D. 
00 Filed: Letter to Dr. Million from Court 
01 ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE scheduled on January 12, 2001 at 09:00 AM 
in Fourth Floor - N4 5 with Judge HANSON. 
Filed order: Progress/violation report: Approved and Ordered: 
OSC shall issue probation violation 
Judge thanson 
Signed January 02, 2001 
Filed: Affidavit in support of OSC 
Issued: Order to Show Cause 
Judge TIMOTHY R. HANSON 
Hearing Date: January 02, 2001 Time: 09:00 
Motion for Discovery 
Motion for More Definite Statement or in the Alternative 
Motion for Bill of Particulars and Motion to Strike 
01 Filed: Memorandum m Support of Motion for More Definite 
Statement or in the Alternative Motion for Bill of Particulars 
and Motion to Strike 
01 ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE scheduled on January 26, 2001 at 09 00 AM 
in Fourth Floor - N4 5 with Judge HANSON. 
01 Minute Entry - Minutes for Law & Motion 
Judge: TIMOTHY R. HANSON 
PRESENT 
Clerk: kathrygw 
Prosecutor: HOWARD R LEMCKE 
Defendant 
Defendant's Attorney(s): LARRY R. KELLER 
01-10-01 Filed: 
01-10-01 Filed: 
01-10-
Video 
Tape Number: 1/12/01 Tape Count: 9:57/10:04 
HEARING 
This matter is re-set as indicated herein on Defendant's Motion. 
APP is to provide a more specifLC statement and names of witnesses 
to the defendant. 
Copy to counsel, APP 
ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE is scheduled. 
Date: 01/26/2001 
Time: 09:00 a.m. 
Location: Fourth Floor - N4 5 
THIRD DISTRICT COURT 
4 50 SOUTH STATE 
SLC, UT 84111-1860 
Before Judge: TIMOTHY R. HANSON 
01-17-01 Filed order: Order granting defendant's motion for billof 
particulars 
Judge thanson 
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Signed January 17, 2001 
01-17-01 Filed order: Order granting defendant's motio for discovery 
Judge thanson 
Signed January 17, 2001 
01-22-01 Filed: Certificate of Service (deffs motion for discovery and 
order granting def's motion for bill of particulars) 
01-26-01 EVIDENTIARY HEARING scheduled on February 16, 2001 at 02:00 PM 
in Fourth Floor - N4 5 with Judge HANSON. 
01-26-01 Minute Entry - Minutes for ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE 
Judge: TIMOTHY R. HANSON 
PRESENT 
Clerk: kathrygw 
Prosecutor: JOY ONTON 
Defendant 
Defendant's Attorney(s): LARRY R. KELLER 
Video 
Tape Number: 1/26/01 Tape Count: 9:05/9:08 
HEARING 
The Defendant denies the 2 allegations in the Order to Show Cause. 
This matter is set for evidentiary hearing as indicated herein. 
Copy to counsel/APP 
Martene Mackay is present on behalf of APP. 
EVIDENTIARY HEARING is scheduled. 
Date: 02/16/2001 
Time: 02:00 p.m. 
Location: Fourth Floor - N45 
THIRD DISTRICT COURT 
4 50 SOUTH STATE 
SLC, UT 84111-1860 
Before Judge: TIMOTHY R. HANSON 
01-30-01 Filed order: Progress/violation report- Hearing set (1/26/01) 
to address probation violations 
Judge thanson 
Signed January 30, 2001 
02-16-01 Minute Entry - Minutes for Order to Show Cause 
Judge: TIMOTHY R. HANSON 
PRESENT 
Clerk: evelynt 
Prosecutor: LEMCKE, HOWARD R 
Defendant 
Defendant's Attorney(s): KELLER, LARRY R. 
Video 
Tape Number: 2/16/01 Tape Count: 2:21/2:40 
HEARING 
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This matter is before the Court for evidentiary hearing regarding 
probation violation. Counsel appearing as shown above. APP is 
present, (Danny Platis ?) 
Counsel advise the Court that they have reached a resolution in 
the matter. Based on the agreement, the Court will dismiss the 
OSC, subject to: 
1. Counsel/APP, providing the Court with information regarding 
the status of the trust fund. 
2. Amounts still owed to victims, how much has been paid, and to 
whom. 
The State has until 6/1/01 to provide the Court with the 
information. Probation will not terminate pending restitution 
being satisfied. 
The Court clarifies the probation condition regarding defendant's 
handling other persons funds. 
Defendant is not be be involved in activities that involves other 
persons money, investments, or involving financial accounts. 
02-16-01 Note: ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE minutes modified. 
03-09-01 Filed order: Supplemental Order of the Court and Dismissal of 
revised Order to Show CAUSE DATED 1/2/01 
Judge thanson 
Signed March 09, 2001 
03-14-01 Filed: Letter to Court form Thomas J. Million, D.M.D. (cc: 
APPD) 
05-31-01 Filed: Motion to Enter Partial Restitution Order and Motion to 
Extend Time to Compelte Restitution Order 
06-05-01 Filed order: Partial restitution order and additional order of 
the Court 
Judge thanson 
Signed June 05, 2001 
06-08-01 Filed: Copy of letter from DOC (APP) to Larry Keller 
07-31-01 Filed: Motion to Enter Final Restitution Order 
08-01-01 Filed order: Final Restitution Order of the Court 
Judge thanson 
Signed August 01, 2001 
08-02-01 Judgment #1 Entered 
Debtor: DAVID J ORR 
Creditor: KURT OSTLER 
30,000.00 restitution 
Debtor: DAVID J ORR 
Creditor: JEFF OSTLER 
30,000.00 restitution 
Creditor: CRAIG GRENIER 
Debtor: DAVID J ORR 
50,000.00 restitution 
110,000.00 Judgment Grand Total 
08-02-01 Filed: Final Restitution Order of the Court @J 
09-18-01 Filed: Letter to court from Thomas J. Million D.M.D., dated 
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8/13/01 
09-18-01 Filed: Ctfs M.E: setting scheduling conferene to determine 
restitution amount againt defendant 
09-18-01 Notice - NOTICE for Case 001902772 ID 921966 
CONFERENCE RE: RESTITUTION is scheduled. 
Date: 10/12/2001 
Time: 02:00 p.m. 
Location: Fourth Floor - N45 
THIRD DISTRICT COURT 
4 50 SOUTH STATE 
SLC, UT 84111-1860 
Before Judge: TIMOTHY R. HANSON 
Scheduling conference, see Court's minute entry 
09-18-01 CONFERENCE RE: RESTITUTION scheduled on October 12, 2001 at 
02:00 PM in Fourth Floor - N4 5 with Judge HANSON. 
10-12-01 Filed: Accounting records, etc., 
10-12-01 Minute Entry - Minutes for MINUTE ENTRY 
Judge: TIMOTHY R. HANSON 
PRESENT 
Clerk: evelynt 
Prosecutor: LEMCKE, HOWARD R 
Defendant 
Defendant's Attorney(s): KELLER, LARRY R. 
Video 
Tape Number: 10/12/01 Tape Count: 2:20/2:33 
HEARING 
This case is before the Court for scheduling conference. 
Defendant and Counsel are present. Robert Egelund (APP) is 
present, and Dr. Thomas J. Million, D.M.D. 
Discussion is had, and the restitution hearing is set as indicated 
herein. 
The only issue to be considered, is Dr. Million's claim. 
RESTITUTION HEARING is scheduled. 
Date: 01/31/2002 
Time: 10:00 a.m. 
Location: Fourth Floor - N45 
THIRD DISTRICT COURT 
4 50 SOUTH STATE 
SLC, UT 84111-1860 
Before Judge: TIMOTHY R. HANSON 
The foregoing dates should be considered firm settings and will not 
be modified without court order, and then only upon a showing of 
manifest injustice. Counsel are instructed to stay in contact with 
the Clerk as the trial date approaches regarding dates. 
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10-12-01 RESTITUTION HEARING scheduled on January 31, 2002 at 10:00 AM 
in Fourth Floor - N4 5 with Judge HANSON. 
01-31-02 Minute Entry - Minutes for MINUTE ENTRY 
Judge: TIMOTHY R. HANSON 
PRESENT 
Clerk: evelynt 
Prosecutor: LEMCKE, HOWARD R 
Defendant 
Defendant's Attorney(s): KELLER, LARRY R. 
Video 
Tape Number: 1/31/02 Tape Count: 10:21/1:25 
HEARING 
This case is before the Court for restitution hearing. Defendant 
is present, and counsel appearing as shown above. 
Counsel present no opening statements. 
COUNT: 10:22 
Dr. Thomas Jackson Million is sworn and examined on behalf of the 
State. 
COUNT: 11:14 
Defendant, David J. Orr is sworn and examined, called by the 
State. 
COUNT: 11:30 
The State rest. 
COUNT: 11:31 
Quinn Howe is sworn and examined on behalf of defendant. 
COUNT: 12:03 
Defendant rest. 
Counsel present closing arguments. 
COUNT: 12:15 
Lunch Recess to 1:00 p.m. 
COUNT: 1:11 
The Court determies that the restitution owed to victim,, Dr. 
Thomas Million, is $255,504.39. This amount may be off-set by any 
amount received from case before Judge Nehring #010901021. 
The Clerk of Court will hold Stocks in question, subject to 
further order of distribution by the Court. 
Anyone wanting to buy the Stock is to petition the Court in 
writing, with detailed amount buyer is willing to pay. 
Mr. Lemcke is to prepare appropriate documentation regarding the 
hearing today. 
01-31-02 Notice - Final Exhibit List 
01-31-02 Note: MINUTE ENTRY minutes modified. 
03-07-02 Fee Account created Total Due: 6.75 
03-07-02 COPY FEE Payment Received: 6.75 
04-30-02 Fine Payment Received: 110.87 
Note: Mail Payment; 
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04-30-02 INTEREST Payment Received: 279.13 
05-14-02 Filed: Letter from Dr. Million, to Court w/attached 
documentsdated 5/6/02 
05-21-02 Fine Payment Received: 42.33 
Note: Mail Payment; 
05-21-02 INTEREST Payment Received: 7.67 
06-04-02 Filed: Letter to Dr. Million from the Court, cc: counsel 
07-01-02 Filed order: Progress/violation report: Approved & Ordered: 
Defendant remains on probation as ordered 
Judge thanson 
Signed July 01, 2002 
07-02-02 Fine Payment Received: 50.00 
Note: Mail Payment; 
07-30-02 Fine Payment Received: 85.33 
Note: Mail Payment; 
07-30-02 INTEREST Payment Received: 24.67 
11-23-02 Note: Accounts Receivable accounted for by Adult Probation and 
Parole. Any outstanding payments should be made to AP&P. 
05-05-03 Filed: Letter to the Court from Thomas J. Million 
05-13-03 Filed order: Progress/violation report; OSC to be set 
Judge thanson 
Signed May 13, 2003 
05-13-03 Filed: Affidavit in support of OSC 
05-13-03 ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE scheduled on May 30, 2003 at 09:00 AM in 
Fourth Floor - N4 5 with Judge HANSON. 
05-13-03 Filed: Faxed documents from APP 
05-23-03 Filed: Motion to Dismiss Order to Show Cause for Lack of 
Jurisdiction 
05-23-03 Filed: Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss Order to Show 
Cause for Lack of Jurisdiction 
05-27-03 Filed: Letter to Thomas J. Million from the Court 
05-30-03 Minute Entry - Minutes for Law and Motion 
Judge: TIMOTHY R. HANSON 
PRESENT 
Clerk: evelynt 
Prosecutor: BERNARDS-GOODMAN, KATHERINE 
Defendant 
Defendant's Attorney(s): KELLER, LARRY R. 
Video 
Tape Number: 5/30/03 Tape Count: 9:25 
HEARING 
Defendant's motion to dismiss is argued, and the court allows the 
State to respond to the motion. State is to file their response by 
6/13/03. 
Any final reply is due by 6/20/03. 
Hearing on the motion is set as indicated herein. 
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cc: counsel/app 
MOTION TO DISMISS is scheduled. 
Date: 06/23/2003 
Time: 11:00 a.m. 
Location: Fourth Floor - N45 
THIRD DISTRICT COURT 
4 50 SOUTH STATE 
SLC, UT 84114-1860 
Before Judge: TIMOTHY R. HANSON 
06-02-03 MOTION TO DISMISS scheduled on June 23, 2003 at 11:00 AM in 
Fourth Floor - N4 5 with Judge HANSON. 
06-20-03 Filed: Memo to the Court from APP 
06-23-03 Minute Entry - Minutes for Law and Motion 
Judge: TIMOTHY R. HANSON 
PRESENT 
Clerk: evelynt 
Prosecutor: LEMCKE, HOWARD R 
Defendant 
Defendant's Attorney(s): KELLER, LARRY R. 
Video 
Tape Number: 6/23/03 Tape Count: 11:25/12:10 
HEARING 
This matter is before the Court for oral argument regarding 
defendant's motion to dismiss, on basis of lost jurisdiction. 
Appearances as shown above. Robert Egelund appearing on behalf of 
APP. 
Counsel present arguments to the Court, 
robert Egelund is sworn and examined. 
Counsel present closing arguments. The matter is submitted. 
Based upon the foregoing, the Court denies the defendant's motion 
to dismiss. 
The defendant is ordered to satusfy the May & June restitution 
payments within 30 days. 
The Court will issue a formal Order regarding the hearing today, 
and in so doing, will determine the appropriate time to extend the 
probation period. 
06-23-03 Notice - Final Exhibit List 
07-02-03 Filed order: Memorandum Decision and Order (def's motion to 
dismiss denied; probation extended to the remaining term of his 
sentence - 10 years) 
Judge thanson 
Signed July 02, 2003 
07-09-03 Filed: Notice of Appeal 
07-14-03 Note: Forwarded Cert/Copy of Notice of Appeal to Court of 
Appeals 
07-15-03 Filed order: Progress/violation report: Approved & Ordered: 
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CASE NUMBER 001902772 State Felony 
Probation reduced to an amt approved by APPD, either side may 
request hearing if dispute 
Judge thanson 
Signed July 15, 2003 
07-16-03 Filed: Transcript of OSC hearing dated June 23, 2003, Beverly 
Lowe, CCT 
07-17-03 Filed: Letter from Court of Appeals - Noa received, Court of 
Appeals No. 20030574-ca 
07-31-03 Filed order: Progress/violation report; Court Update 
Judge thanson 
Signed July 31, 2003 
09-08-03 Filed: Letter to Court from Thomas Million, D.M.D. 
09-24-03 Filed: Motion for Issuance of Certificate of Probable Cause and 
Request for Oral Argument 
09-24-03 Filed: Ex Parte Motion for Leave to File Over-Length Memroandum 
09-24-03 Filed: Memorandum in Support of Defendant's Motion for 
Certificate of Probable Cause and Motion for Stay of Execution 
10-01-03 Minute Entry - Minutes for MINUTE ENTRY 
Judge: TIMOTHY R. HANSON 
Clerk: evelynt 
HEARING 
The Court has received and reviewed the defendant's motion for 
Certificate of Probable Cause. 
The Court sets the matter for oral argument for October 14, 2003, 
at 9:00 A.M. 
Counsel for the State is to file any reply memorandum no later 
than 5 working days prior to hearing. 
The Court has set this matter for a 30 minute setting. 
10-01-03 MOTION HEARING scheduled on October 14, 2003 at 09:00 AM in 
Fourth Floor - N4 5 with Judge HANSON. 
10-09-03 Filed: Joint and Stipulated Motion to Continue 
10-14-03 MOTION HEARING Cancelled. 
Reason: ATD requested continuance. 
10-14-03 ORAL ARGUMENT scheduled on November 20, 2003 at 09:00 AM in 
Fourth Floor - N4 5 with Judge HANSON. 
10-14-03 Filed order: Order on Joint Motion to continue hearin gon 
defendant's motion for certificte of probable cause 
Judge thanson 
Signed October 14, 2003 
10-23-03 Note: Indexed - record forwarded to Court of Appeals (2 files, 
1 transcript, 2 envelopes exhibits) 
11-17-03 Filed: Letter dated 11/10/03 to the Court from Dr. Saeed 
Ghaderi 
11-20-03 Minute Entry - Minutes for INCOURT NOTE 
Judge: TIMOTHY R. HANSON 
PRESENT 
Clerk: kathrygw 
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CASE NUMBER 001902772 State Felony 
Prosecutor: LEMCKE, HOWARD R 
Defendant 
Defendant's Attorney(s): KELLER, LARRY R. 
Video 
Tape Number: 11/20/03 Tape Count: 9:04/9:14 
This matter is before the Court on Defendant's Motion for 
Certificate of Probable Cause. The Court heard argument and based 
thereon, the motion is denied. This Minute Entry will stand as the 
Court's Order. 
11-26-03 Filed: **UNSIGNED** order denying defendant's request for 
certification of probable cause filed unsigned; order (11/20/03 
M.E.) already entered 
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